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Introduction
Workers’ compensation programs constitute the original example 
of	public	“social	insurance”	in	the	United	States,	dating	to	the	early	
twentieth	century.	They	also	represent	 the	first	“no-fault”	insurance	
programs, as they replaced tort liability through the courts as a way 
to cope with the growing incidence of injuries as America became 
industrialized. These state government programs specify medical 
and	wage-loss	benefits	that	must	be	provided	by	employers	for	their	
workers who become disabled by work-related injury or disease.1 
The state and provincial workers’ compensation programs for 
injured workers in North America emanate from a historical com-
promise. Workers who had an employment-related injury gave up 
their right to sue their employers under common law for negligence 
in exchange for receiving prompt and certain medical, rehabilitation, 
and	 wage-loss	 benefits.	While	 the	 actual	 amount	 of	 compensation	
would	be	significantly	 less	 than	would	be	received	from	a	success-
ful	tort	liability	suit,	the	certainty	of	receiving	benefits	that	would	be	
adequate	and	equitable	would	be	worth	the	trade-off.	
Over the years, the programs have been subjected to intense par-
tisan criticism, interpretation and reinterpretation by the courts, and 
reforms and re-reforms as the political winds have blown back and 
forth. Now, as workers’ compensation programs pass the century mark 
since their original enactment, it is time for a reevaluation (Grabell 
and	Berkes	2015;	USDOL	2016).
This volume represents an effort to draw policy implications from 
research in three critical performance areas for workers’ compensa-
tion	programs:	1)	the	adequacy	of	compensation	for	those	disabled	in	
the	workplace,	 2)	 return-to-work	 performance	 for	 injured	workers,	
and	3)	prevention	of	disabling	injury	and	disease.	We	believe	these	
are, or should be, the three most important objectives for workers’ 
compensation systems. Thus, the three chapters that follow, dealing 
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in turn with these three topics, provide our assessment of the perfor-
mance	 of	workers’	 compensation	 systems	 after	 the	 first	 100	 years.	
We	explore	best	practices	among	the	states	and	find	hopeful	signs	of	
progress in some states. Furthermore, we believe these best practices 
could provide the outline of an agenda for true reform of workers’ 
compensation in the United States.
It is clear that additional research on workers’ compensation pro-
grams is needed—particularly research that uses similar methods and 
types of data across different states to build a consensus of compara-
tive results and policy insights. But research on workers’ compensa-
tion policy issues faces many hurdles. First, state workers’ compensa-
tion	systems	differ	significantly	from	each	other,	in	both	substantial	
and trivial ways. Sometimes these differences are obvious and make 
direct comparisons impossible. Other differences are more subtle and 
therefore easy for the researcher to miss, making comparisons mis-
leading.	This	is	particularly	annoying	to	those	state	officials	who	are	
expert in their own system and protective of its public image. In either 
case,	 direct	 comparisons	 between	 systems	 are	 difficult,	 and	 poten-
tially dangerous, in a contentious political environment.
In	addition,	research	studies	designed	to	answer	specific	policy	
questions	 in	 different	 jurisdictions	 likely	 used	 different	 data	 and	
methods and for those reasons may not be directly comparable. This 
is	demonstrated	by	the	research	on	benefit	adequacy	in	workers’	com-
pensation that is reviewed here. As a result, research studies on work-
ers’ compensation programs often are descriptive and focus on one or 
a small number of jurisdictions to preserve their credibility.2 But of 
course that undermines their effective application to other systems.
Because of these and other barriers, the burden of sponsoring 
policy-relevant research falls pretty much on the workers’ compensa-
tion systems themselves. And to say that the administrators of these 
systems	are	not	always	eager	to	consider	a	“research	solution”	to	a	
policy problem would be a considerable understatement. Given the 
intensely political environment when dealing with relations between 
labor and business—relations that also involve serious cost issues—
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keeping one’s head down is a good strategy for workers’ compensa-
tion administrators. 
Nevertheless, the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
has conducted, supported, and published research on workers’ com-
pensation	programs	for	nearly	40	years.	We	began	with	the	specific	
policy	issue	of	inflation	protection	for	injured	workers	in	the	Michi-
gan	workers’	 compensation	 system	 in	 the	 late	 1970s	 (Hunt	 1981).	
Over the years, our activities expanded to include many of the major 
issues around preventing and compensating for disability at the state, 
federal, and international levels.3
In this book, we review the status of state workers’ compensation 
programs on the three critical performance dimensions mentioned 
earlier	 (benefit	 adequacy,	 return-to-work	 performance,	 and	 preven-
tion)	at	the	programs’	centennial	milepost,	using	the	research	record	
that has been compiled to date. We do not offer a comprehensive 
review of the literature but rather provide a more selective sampling 
of research on these policy issues. We have based our conclusions 
largely on our own research, on research the Upjohn Institute has pub-
lished, and on other research familiar to us. Thus, this volume has a 
more personal perspective than the typical research publication. 
We sincerely hope that these analyses will prove useful for poli-
cymakers and policy researchers who are eager to carry the torch for-
ward and see that much-needed improvements are made. It is vital 
that we determine whether these century-old programs still have the 
capacity to resolve the societal problems of occupational injury and 
disease, or whether they need more than mere updating.
Notes
 1. There are several good introductions to workers’ compensation avail-
able.	See	Baldwin	and	McLaren	(2016).
   2. But see the New Mexico study of comparative permanent partial dis-
ability	(PPD)	compensation	adequacy	for	an	outstanding	counterexam-
ple	in	Reville	et	al.	(2001).
  3. See research.upjohn.org/workcomp_dis/ for all relevant Upjohn Insti-
tute publications since 1980.
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Benefit	Adequacy	and	Equity
Workers’ compensation programs for workers disabled by their 
work are the oldest social insurance programs in the United States 
and	Canada.	Issues	of	benefit	adequacy	and	equity	have	been	central	
to workers’ compensation systems from the start, at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. 
The	simplest	way	to	assess	the	adequacy	and	equity	of	benefits	
is with reference to the statutory framework.1 What level of wage 
replacement	is	specified	by	statute?	The	most	common	index	among	
U.S.	 states	 is	 66.67	 percent	 (two-thirds)	 gross	 wage	 replacement.2  
This	 reflects	 the	 fact	 that	 such	wage-replacement	 benefits	 are	 free	
of any federal or state tax, as well as a desire by policymakers to 
maintain	work	 incentives	 by	 ensuring	 that	 there	 is	 a	 net	 benefit	 to	
working.	The	fact	that	there	are	specific	caps	on	maximum	benefits	
in	all	workers’	compensation	states,	and	 that	minimum	benefits	are	
provided in most, also clearly indicates that there has been some leg-
islative judgment of the amount of wage replacement that is thought 
to be appropriate.
Equity	is	also	relatively	simple	to	measure	in	concept.	An	equi-
table system is one in which all workers would be treated the same, 
or those in similar circumstances would be treated in similar ways. 
These policy concerns directly introduce an element of social welfare 
into	the	evaluation	of	workers’	compensation	benefits.
Beginning at least with Professor Arthur H. Reede in 1947 
(whose seminal work, Adequacy of Workmen’s Compensation, is 
cited	in	Somers	and	Somers	[1954],	p.	80),	scholars	of	workers’	com-
pensation have struggled to provide an accurate assessment of ben-
efit	 adequacy.	Obviously	 it	 is	 a	 prime	point	 of	 contention	between	
the interests of injured workers and the employers who pay for their 
workers’	compensation	insurance.	It	is	also	a	major	influence	on	any	
assessment of the sociopolitical performance of workers’ compensa-
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tion	programs	as	 a	way	of	handling	 the	consequences	of	 industrial	
injuries and illnesses.
This chapter will review the empirical evidence from existing 
studies	of	benefit	adequacy	and	equity	in	workers’	compensation	pro-
grams	in	the	United	States	and	Canada.	We	concentrate	on	both	find-
ings	and	methods,	since	there	is	still	disagreement	about	the	“best”	
way	 to	 measure	 benefit	 adequacy	 empirically.	 We	 pay	 particular	
attention to a pair of recent Canadian studies that have not had much 
exposure. These studies are notable for their thorough and original 
exploration of the implications of methodology in such research. Our 
expectation is that our paper will help to stimulate additional discus-
sion	and	perhaps	prompt	new	studies	of	benefit	adequacy	and	equity	
performance by these important social insurance programs.
PREVIOUS	STUDIES
One	 method	 that	 researchers	 have	 employed	 to	 study	 benefit	
adequacy	has	been	 to	conduct	 interviews	of	 injured	workers.	John-
son,	 Cullinan,	 and	 Curington	 (1979)	 studied	 benefit	 adequacy	 by	
interviewing	nearly	2,000	workers’	compensation	beneficiaries	with	
severe permanent impairments in California, Florida, New York, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. They examined both the extent to which 
injured	 workers	 received	 workers’	 compensation	 benefits	 and	 the	
degree	to	which	people	receiving	benefits	were	compensated	for	their	
lost	wages.	They	found	that	the	average	total	wage	loss	during	the	five	
to	seven	years	after	injury	was	$5,842	in	1975	dollars	and	that	almost	
three-fourths	of	the	sample	were	still	experiencing	significant	wage	
loss	 (at	 least	 $500	 per	 annum)	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 survey.	Approxi-
mately 10 percent of the sample never returned to work after their 
injuries, and these individuals had a 22 percent wage replacement 
rate for the entire period. Among those still receiving workers’ com-
pensation	benefits	at	 the	 time	of	 the	 survey,	only	an	average	of	12	
percent	of	the	wage	loss	was	being	replaced	five	years	after	the	injury.	
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Johnson,	Cullinan,	and	Curington	called	the	replacement	rate	“clearly	
inadequate”	(p.	97).
The California Workers’ Compensation Institute commissioned 
another	interview	study	of	benefit	adequacy	in	California	in	the	early	
1980s.	As	part	of	the	study,	an	independent	research	firm	interviewed	
1,076 people with workers’ compensation claims from 1975 and 1976 
six to seven years after the injury. The study found that the Califor-
nia workers’ compensation system on average replaced 49 percent of 
lost	earnings,	and	that	people	with	the	lowest	disability	ratings	(1–9	
percent)	 had	 the	 highest	 replacement	 rate—over	 80	 percent.	How-
ever, the study also found that for the most serious (permanent and 
total	disability)	claims,	the	replacement	rate	was	67	percent,	as	speci-
fied	by	statute.	Nevertheless,	the	study	concluded	that	the	California	
workers’	compensation	system	provided	benefits	that	were	both	inad-
equate	and	inequitable	(CWCI	[1984],	cited	in	Hunt	[2004],	p.	105).
More	 recent	 benefit	 adequacy	 studies	 generally	 use	 workers’	
compensation administrative data on injured workers, combined with 
wage records from a sample of comparison workers who were not 
injured, in an attempt to estimate what workers would have earned 
in the absence of the injury. They then calculate the loss replacement 
rate as the extent to which workers’ compensation replaces compen-
sation that they would have earned in the absence of the injury. 
		 	 	 	 		WC	income	benefits	
Loss replacement rate = ____________________________________
	 	 																Comparison	earnings	–	postinjury	earnings
Berkowitz	and	Burton	(1987)	implemented	the	first	modern	wage	
loss study of state workers’ compensation programs. In addition to 
describing the provisions of the varied programs for compensating 
permanently disabling injuries in 10 states, they also analyzed wage 
replacement performance in three states (Wisconsin, California, and 
Florida)	in	a	project	funded	by	the	National	Science	Foundation	and	
ultimately	published	by	the	Upjohn	Institute.	The	findings	were	par-
ticularly stimulating because of the variety of disability evaluation 
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strategies employed in these states. At the time of the observed inju-
ries in 1968, Wisconsin used an impairment-level standard, California 
used a loss-of-earning-capacity standard, and Florida offered injured 
workers their choice between the two standards (Berkowitz and Bur-
ton	 1987,	Chapter	 10).	 If	 a	 judgment	 could	 be	made	 about	 benefit	
adequacy	under	different	disability	evaluation	methods,	this	would	be	
valuable information for policymakers.
For a sample of workers’ compensation injuries in 1968 from 
each	of	 the	 three	 states,	Berkowitz	and	Burton	 (1987)	 secured	 two	
years	 of	 preinjury	wage	 data	 and	five	 to	 six	 years	 (1968–1973)	 of	
postinjury earnings data from the Social Security Administration, as 
well	as	the	actual	workers’	compensation	indemnity	benefits	paid	to	
the injured workers in California, Florida, and Wisconsin. Their com-
parison group to estimate wage loss consisted of California workers 
who were also injured in 1968 but whose injuries received less than a 
5	percent	permanent	disability	rating.	They	also	calculated	“expected	
growth	ratios”	for	future	wages	by	age,	gender,	and	earnings	level	of	
the California sample and applied these ratios to similar workers in 
other states.
Berkowitz	 and	 Burton	 (1987)	 found	 that	 the	 overall	 wage	
replacement rates were 46 percent for California, 59 percent for 
Florida,	and	75	percent	for	Wisconsin	(p.	357).	But	the	replacement	
rates varied widely between contested and uncontested cases.3 For 
contested cases, the replacement rates were relatively similar to the 
overall	replacement	rates	for	California	(41	percent)	and	Florida	(51	
percent),	which	had	high	rates	of	disputes	(90	percent	and	70	percent	
contested	 claims,	 respectively).	However,	 contested	 claims	 in	Wis-
consin	were	much	less	common	(only	14	percent)	and	received	lower	
wage replacement compensation at 58 percent.
For uncontested cases, however, the replacement rates were 
much higher for California and Florida. In California, Berkowitz and 
Burton	(1987)	found	that	injured	workers	generally	had	no	losses	in	
uncontested	cases,	meaning	the	replacement	rate	was	infinite.	In	Wis-
consin, the replacement rate was 85 percent for uncontested cases. In 
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Florida, they found that workers’ compensation replaced 724 percent 
of earnings losses, on average. These results were troubling. 
In addition to the high degree of variability in the replacement 
rate based on the litigation status of the case, Berkowitz and Bur-
ton	(1987)	found	a	high	degree	of	variability	in	the	replacement	rate	
based	on	the	age	of	the	worker	and	the	body	part	injured.	These	find-
ings indicate that the workers’ compensation programs in these states 
faced	serious	equity	issues	as	well	as	adequacy	issues.
Boden	and	Galizzi	(1999)	estimated	wages	lost	from	work-related	
injuries in Wisconsin by comparing injured workers who missed more 
than	 one	week	 of	work	 in	 1989–1990	 to	workers	with	 less	 severe	
injuries who missed less than one week of work. They found that the 
Wisconsin workers’ compensation system replaced 64 percent of pre-
tax lost wages for men and 50 percent of pretax lost wages for women 
with	temporary	total	disability	(TTD)	and	permanent	partial	disability	
(PPD)	claims	in	the	four	to	five	years	after	the	injury.	But	the	replace-
ment rates varied greatly by the amount of time missed from work. 
Workers’ compensation in Wisconsin provided a replacement rate of 
over 80 percent for TTD claims lasting less than six weeks but a much 
lower replacement rate for TTD claims of longer duration. This was 
because people with longer-duration TTD claims experienced wage 
losses even after they no longer received workers’ compensation ben-
efits.	Boden	and	Galizzi	found	that	PPD	benefits	replaced	83	percent	
of lost income for men and 63 percent of lost income for women. So, 
again,	there	seem	to	be	equity	issues	arising	from	the	different	rates	of	
wage loss replacement for workers in different situations.
Peterson	 et	 al.	 (1998)	 and	 Reville	 (1999)	 studied	 replacement	
rates for PPD claimants in California by matching workers injured 
in	1993–1994	to	uninjured	workers	employed	at	 the	same	firm	and	
with similar preinjury wages. They found that injured workers earned 
40	percent	less	pretax	than	noninjured	workers	during	the	five	years	
following the accident and that workers’ compensation replaced 38 
percent of this loss. Reville also considered earnings loss and replace-
ment rates by disability ratings. He found that injured workers with 
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higher disability ratings experienced both higher earnings losses and 
higher replacement rates of those earnings losses than those with less 
serious injuries.
Biddle	(1998)	estimated	lost	wages	for	seriously	injured	workers	
in	 the	 state	of	Washington	by	comparing	workers	 injured	 in	1993–
1994	who	received	indemnity	(wage	loss)	payments	in	the	3.5	years	
after	an	injury	to	those	who	had	medical-only	claims.	He	first	showed	
that seriously injured workers who experienced time loss of 15 or 
more	days	experienced	lost	wages	immediately	in	the	quarter	of	their	
injury. After 3.5 years, the difference between the seriously injured 
workers and the control group of medical-only claims had shrunk 
but had not gone away completely. Biddle found that the Washington 
workers’ compensation system replaced an average of 40 percent of 
after-tax lost wages for workers with time-loss claims over the 3.5 
years after injury.
Unlike	 what	 Boden	 and	 Galizzi	 (1999)	 found	 in	 Wisconsin,	
injured workers in Washington who missed more time had higher 
replacement rates than those who missed less time. For workers with 
permanent disabilities, the after-tax replacement rates were over 100 
percent.	A	possible	 explanation	 for	 this	may	be	 that	Biddle	 (1998)	
had only 3.5 years of data after the injury. The most severely injured 
workers	may	 have	 experienced	 losses	 for	 years	 after	 their	 benefits	
ceased,	while	PPD	benefits	are	given	in	a	lump	sum	after	the	injury	in	
Washington. When Biddle projected 10-year replacement rates based 
upon presumptions about future earnings and workers’ compensation 
benefits,	the	average	PPD	replacement	rate	shrank	to	34	percent.
Biddle	 (1998)	 also	 investigated	 the	distribution	of	wage	 losses	
across workers and how wage losses differed based on demographic 
characteristics and injury types. He found that a small number of 
workers	experienced	very	significant	wage	loss.	Of	workers	missing	
15–60	days	of	work	during	the	observation	period,	10	percent	were	
still experiencing large earnings losses one year after the injury. He 
found that workers under 26 years of age experienced higher earn-
ings losses compared to older workers with similar preinjury wages. 
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Head injuries led to greater wage losses than injuries to other parts 
of the body, and married women experienced greater earnings losses 
than both married men and unmarried men. Injured workers expe-
rienced similar losses regardless of whether they were employed at 
self-insured	firms	or	insured	firms.
In	the	most	ambitious	effort	to	date,	Reville	et	al.	(2001)	evalu-
ated	the	benefit	adequacy	of	workers’	compensation	for	PPD	claim-
ants in New Mexico by comparing replacement rates for PPD 
claimants	 in	New	Mexico	 in	1994–1998	 to	PPD	claimants	 in	Cali-
fornia, Wisconsin, Washington, and Oregon over the same period. To 
calculate replacement rates, they examined the degree to which work-
ers’	 compensation	 benefits	 offset	 the	 earnings	 differences	 between	
workers with partially disabling occupational injuries and similar 
workers	without	 injuries	 during	 the	 five	 years	 after	 the	 first	 group	
suffered injury. New Mexico PPD claimants lost 23 percent of their 
earnings	on	average	during	the	first	five	years	after	the	injury	and	20.5	
percent	of	their	wages	during	the	first	10	years	after	the	injury.
During	the	first	five	years	after	the	injury,	the	pretax	replacement	
rate in New Mexico was 65 percent, nearly identical to the two-thirds 
statutory standard. During the 10 years after the injury, the pretax 
replacement	rate	fell	to	46	percent,	as	benefits	fell	off	more	rapidly	
than did wage losses. Ten-year pretax loss-replacement rates were 
37 percent, 42 percent, 41 percent, and 29 percent in California, 
Oregon,	Washington,	and	Wisconsin,	respectively	(Table	2.1).	Thus,	
New Mexico had the highest replacement rates of any of the states. 
However, after accounting for differences in industry composition 
between the states, New Mexico had a replacement rate that was in 
the	middle	of	the	states.	Reville	et	al.	(2001)	found	that	claimants	in	
the top 20 percent of the income distribution in New Mexico had the 
lowest earnings replacement, while replacement rates were relatively 
equitable	for	the	rest	of	the	income	distribution.
This	was	the	“state	of	the	science”	when	the	National	Academy	of	
Social Insurance and the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
published Adequacy of Earnings Replacement in Workers’ Compen-
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sation Programs	 (Hunt	2004).	A	Study	Panel	on	Benefit	Adequacy	
of the National Academy spent several years reviewing conceptual 
issues and evaluating the empirical work that had been done to that 
time.	The	 study	 panel	 endorsed	 the	wage-loss	 studies	 as	 “the	 best	
yardstick	 to	measure	 the	 adequacy	of	 benefits”	 (p.	 132).	However,	
“for	all	categories	involving	substantial	lost	time	from	work	or	perma-
nent disabilities, aggregate replacement rates are considerably below 
the two-thirds standard when considered over the 10-year period fol-
lowing	the	injury”	(p.	132).
In addition, the study panel called for additional wage loss stud-
ies from other states, especially studies that included TTD claims and 
studies	from	states	using	alternative	methods	for	setting	PPD	benefits.	
The hope was that additional studies would provide more guidance 
to	policymakers	seeking	 the	most	adequate,	equitable,	and	efficient	
wage replacement policy.
However, we are aware of only three other U.S. studies since 
the release of the study panel report and recommendations in 2004. 
Seabury	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 studied	New	Mexico	workers’	 compensation	
claims with injury dates from 1994 to 2000. This study linked back to 
the early Berkowitz and Burton study by utilizing federal data from 
the Internal Revenue Service and Social Security Administration 
rather than state unemployment insurance data to determine earnings. 
Table	2.1		Ten-Year	Earnings	Losses	and	Replacement	Rates	for	 
PPD Claimants
NM WA CA WI OR
Potential	earnings	($) 167,244 250,251 238,262 222,055 197,737
10-year	losses	($) 34,314 41,220 61,767 49,477 39,202
Total	benefits	($) 15,832 16,734 22,612 14,452 16,636
Proportional wage  
loss	(%)a
20 16 25 23 20
Pretax wage loss  
replacement	rate	(%)b
46 41 37 29 42
a Row 2 / Row 1.
b Row 3 / Row 2.
SOURCE:	Adapted	from	Reville,	Bhattacharya,	and	Weinstein	(2001).
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Seabury et al. were able to secure actual earnings data for up to 10 
years	following	the	injury.	But	findings	were	disappointing,	as	they	
estimated that only 16 percent of losses were replaced by workers’ 
compensation	benefits.	
Dworsky	et	al.	(2016)	used	the	same	methods	as	Reville,	Bhat-
tacharya,	and	Weinstein	(2001)	to	study	trends	in	earnings	losses	and	
workers’	 compensation	 benefits	 paid	 before,	 during,	 and	 after	 the	
“Great	Recession”	in	California.	This	study,	funded	by	the	Califor-
nia Commission on Health and Safety and Workers’ Compensation, 
probes the impacts of the recession during a period that also saw con-
siderable	policy	changes	 in	benefits	 for	permanently	disabled	Cali-
fornia workers. They found that workers injured during and after the 
Great	Recession	of	2008–2009	experienced	substantially	higher	earn-
ings losses than those injured earlier. Impairment ratings and workers’ 
compensation	benefits	both	increased,	but	the	loss	replacement	rate	
still decreased because of a shift toward lower wage levels for work-
ers injured during the recession. 
The third study was supported by the Workers Compensation 
Research Institute and is reported in some detail below (Savych and 
Hunt	2016).	Covering	Michigan	workers	 injured	 in	2004	and	earn-
ings	records	through	2008,	this	study	raises	questions	about	the	most	
appropriate measure of earnings losses for workers’ compensation 
policy purposes. 
MORE	RECENT	CANADIAN	STUDIES
Tompa,	Scott-Marshall,	et	al.	(2010),	from	the	Institute	for	Work	
and Health in Toronto, have contributed a more recent Canadian per-
spective to this body of work. In a path-setting but little-known study 
for	 the	Workplace	Safety	 and	 Insurance	Board	 (WSIB)	 in	Ontario,	
they	compared	the	benefit	adequacy	of	three	Canadian	compensation	
regimes:	 1)	 the	 permanent-impairment	 regime	 in	 place	 in	 Ontario	
before	 the	 1990	 reforms,	 2)	 the	 loss-of-earnings-capacity	 regime	
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installed	in	Ontario	by	the	1990	reforms,	and	3)	the	bifurcated	regime	
(claimant gets the higher of impairment or loss-of-earnings-capacity 
benefit)	in	British	Columbia	before	2002.	
Table 2.2 shows the details of compensation regimes for the three 
Canadian workers’ compensation programs studied by Tompa, Scott-
Marshall,	et	al.	(2010).	Ontario	based	compensation	on	after-tax	(or	
spendable)	 earnings,	 with	 a	 90	 percent	 nominal	 replacement	 rate.	
British Columbia used the more traditional 75 percent of preinjury 
gross	(i.e.,	before-tax)	earnings.
Tompa,	Scott-Marshall,	et	al.	(2010)	also	provide	a	painstaking	
analysis of the different methodologies for measuring the earnings 
losses of injured workers. For instance, they explain and illustrate 
the	 differences	 between	 the	 “loss	 replacement	 rate”	 and	 the	 “earn-
ings	replacement	rate.”	The	loss	replacement	rate	uses	the	difference	
between comparison group earnings and injured worker earnings as 
the	 denominator,	 with	 workers’	 compensation	 benefits	 paid	 as	 the	
numerator to calculate the rate. 
		 	 	 	 		WC	income	benefits	
Loss replacement rate = ____________________________________
	 	 																Comparison	earnings	–	postinjury	earnings
The earnings replacement rate adds the postinjury earnings of 
injured workers to the numerator, thereby taking into account the 
residual earning capacity of injured workers. It then compares this 
total to the estimated earnings in the absence of injury (comparison 
earnings).	The	result	is	a	higher	measured	replacement	rate,	which	is	
due	to	the	mathematics,	but	which	also	more	accurately	reflects	the	
fact that most injured workers will return to work and their earnings 
losses will be temporary. Thus, the earnings replacement rate takes 
the	perspective	of	the	injured	worker	and	his/her	income	flow	rather	
than the perspective of the workers’ compensation system. 
 
		 	 	 					WC	income	benefits	+	postinjury	earnings
Earnings replacement rate = __________________________________
                        Comparison earnings
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Table 2.2  Summary of Three Long-Term Disability Compensation Programs
Program
Short-term 
disability  
benefit	amounta
Criteria 
for long-term 
disability	benefitb
Long-term 
disability	benefit	
amounta
Time period 
for long-term  
disability	benefits
Separate loss 
of	quality	of	
life award paid
Permanent impairment 
(Ontario,	pre-1990)
90% of preaccident, 
after-tax earnings
Permanent impairment 
after MMI
90% × preaccident, 
after-tax earnings × 
percentage permanent 
impairment
Benefits	paid	
for life
No
Loss of earnings capacity 
(Ontario,	post-1990)
90% of preaccident, 
after-tax earnings
12 continuous 
months on short-term 
disability	benefits
90% × after-tax loss 
of earnings capacity
Benefits	received	until	
age 65, followed by 
pension based on 10% 
of	benefits	received
Yes
Bifurcated (British 
Columbia,	pre-2002)
75% of preaccident, 
before-tax earnings
Permanent impairment 
after MMI
Higher of:
1)	75%	×	preaccident,	
before-tax earnings 
× percentage perma-
nent impairment; OR
Benefits	paid	for	life No
2)	75%	×	before-tax	
loss of earnings 
capacity
a Subject to maximum compensable earnings limit.
b “MMI”	refers	to	maximum	medical	improvement,	the	conventional	time	for	assessing	the	level	of	remaining	permanent	disability.
SOURCE:	Tompa,	Scott-Marshall,	et	al.	(2010),	Table	1.
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Figure 2.1 shows the aggregate after-tax loss replacement rates 
for the Canadian systems analyzed by Tompa, Scott-Marshall, et al. 
(2010).	These	workers’	compensation	systems	replace	an	average	of	
60–140	percent	of	lost	earnings,	with	the	bifurcated	system	yielding	
considerably	higher	numbers	than	the	other	two	(which	are	quite	sim-
ilar).	This	should	not	be	surprising:	since	the	bifurcated	system	gives	
the	higher	of	the	two	benefits	under	the	other	regimes,	it	is	nearly	cer-
tain to yield a higher average number than either of the others alone, 
unless one of them is consistently higher than the other.
Overall, it appears that these Canadian systems replace an aver-
age	of	at	least	75–80	percent	of	after-tax	lost	wages,	except	for	the	
low	(1–5	percent)	impairment	group.	There	also	appears	to	be	a	ten-
dency for loss replacement rates to increase with severity of impair-
ment in all three systems. The exception is for those with greater than 
50 percent impairment in the bifurcated system.
Figure 2.1  Aggregate Loss Replacement Rates
SOURCE:	Developed	by	the	authors	from	Tompa,	Scott-Marshall,	et	al.	(2010).
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Figure 2.2 compares the postinjury earnings plus workers’ com-
pensation	benefits	paid	for	each	injured	worker	to	the	earnings	of	the	
uninjured comparison group. It uses this aggregate-level earnings 
replacement	rate	as	the	measure	of	benefit	adequacy.	Therefore,	ben-
efit	adequacy	is	expressed	as	the	percentage	of	after-tax	lost	earnings	
that	 are	 replaced	 by	workers’	 compensation	 benefit	 payments	 plus	
workers’ estimated earnings for the 10 years following the injury.
Figure 2.2 shows this estimate for the range of impairment levels, 
from the minor to the very serious. This makes it possible to judge the 
equity	of	the	benefits	paid	by	the	workers’	compensation	system.	It	
would be desirable for all injured workers to receive the same replace-
ment	level	of	their	lost	earnings,	subject	to	the	impact	of	benefit	caps,	
which would tend to reduce the replacement rates for higher-earning 
workers. The Ontario impairment scheme comes very close to achiev-
ing that objective, with consistent earnings replacement rates until the 
Figure	2.2		Aggregate	Earnings	Replacement	Rates
SOURCE:	Developed	by	the	authors	from	Tompa,	Scott-Marshall,	et	al.	(2010).
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50 percent impairment level. British Columbia shows more variation 
by impairment level. 
These	benefit	adequacy	rates	cannot	be	precisely	compared	with	
the earlier studies in the United States because of the differences in 
methodology.	However,	 since	Tompa,	Scott-Marshall,	 et	 al.	 (2010)	
did report the aggregate-level loss replacement rates for these three 
workers’ compensation regimes, this facilitates rough compari-
sons with the U.S. studies cited earlier. Table 2.3 shows that for the 
Ontario pre-1990 impairment rating system, the after-tax aggregate 
loss replacement rate was 76 percent. For the post-1990 Ontario 
loss-of-earnings-capacity rating system, the aggregate loss replace-
ment rate was 80 percent; for the British Columbia bifurcated sys-
tem, the aggregate loss replacement rate was 95 percent. Clearly, all 
three of these regimes were more generous in replacing lost earn-
ings for injured workers than any of the U.S. states studied to date. 
Furthermore,	 all	 but	 the	 1–5	 percent	 impairment	 group	 in	 British	
Columbia achieved more than 100 percent aggregate-level after-tax 
loss replacement rates. Concern about this apparent overcompensa-
tion was a major motivating factor in the elimination of the British 
Columbia bifurcated system of compensation in 2002.
In	 another	 commissioned	 study,	Tompa,	Mustard,	 et	 al.	 (2010)	
evaluated the impact of the major revisions to the workers’ com-
pensation	benefits	in	British	Columbia	that	took	effect	in	June	2002	
(Bill	49).	These	changes	included	altering	the	compensation	benefit	
formula from 75 percent of preaccident, before-tax gross earnings to 
90 percent of after-tax net earnings. It also involved moving from 
the	 “bifurcated”	 system	 of	 compensating	 permanent	 disabilities	
described earlier to a dominant focus on loss of functional capac-
ity, and a restriction of the cost-of-living adjustment to annual (rather 
than	semiannual)	adjustment	at	1	percent	less	than	the	change	in	the	
consumer	price	index	(CPI),	with	a	cap	of	4	percent	annually	(rather	
than	just	CPI	without	a	cap).4
The	research	team	specifically	was	asked	“to	assess	the	adequacy	
and	 equity	 of	 benefits	 provided	 to	 claimants	 under	 the	 pre–Bill	 49	
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Table 2.3  Replacement Rates by Impairment Stratum for Losses in Three Canadian Workers’ Compensation Programs
Program
Strata 
(%	impairment) Sample size
Proportion 
w/	loss	(%)
Loss 
replacement 
rate	(%)
Earnings 
replacement 
rate	(%)
Permanent-impairment 
program sample
1–5 3,235 71 63 92
6–10 3,415 83 75 91
11–20 3,630 88 77 88
21–50 1,270 93 83 89
> 50 145 97 95 96
Entire sample 11,700 83 76 90
Loss-of-earnings-
capacity program 
sample
1–5 3,005 71 80 91
6–10 2,750 77 77 93
11–20 4,225 83 82 92
21–50 2,755 91 86 92
> 50 150 97 100 100
Entire sample 12,885 81 80 92
Bifurcated program 
sample
1–5 1,670 70 78 95
6–10 515 79 101 100
11–20 290 86 111 105
21–50 125 88 139 119
> 50 45 89 126 119
Entire sample 2,645 75 95 99
SOURCE:	Tompa,	Scott-Marshall,	et	al.	(2010),	Table	5.
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policy	 and	 to	 assess	 the	 impact	 of	Bill	 49	 changes	 on	 benefits	 for	
claimants”	(Tompa,	Mustard,	et	al.	2010,	p.	4).	The	researchers	fol-
lowed the actual earnings of injured workers for 10 years if their 
injury was permanent and six years if temporary. They evaluated the 
impact	of	these	benefit	changes	by	gender,	age,	geographic	location,	
and severity of functional impairment. They used several alternative 
analytical methods, as in the Ontario study. They also used actual 
preinjury earnings to estimate the wage loss for the uninjured state 
instead of a comparison worker method. Again, all empirical results 
were reported so that readers could select the measure they found 
most compelling.
Overall, Bill 49 was estimated to have reduced workers’ compen-
sation	benefits	in	British	Columbia	by	15	percent.	Lesser	functional	
impairment categories had higher earnings recovery, males did better 
than	females,	and	geography	did	not	appear	 to	matter	significantly.	
The long-term disability sample showed an average estimated aggre-
gate-level after-tax earnings replacement rate of 96 percent. However, 
for the 50-to-59-year-old group of injured workers, the 90 percent 
target replacement rate was not reached, either before or after Bill 49. 
Average	aggregate	earnings	replacement	for	the	50–59	age	group	was	
78 percent.
The short-term disability sample suffered an estimated average 
reduction of 9 percent in earnings over six years, but most demo-
graphic strata still did achieve 90 percent earnings replacement. 
Again,	 the	 exception	was	 the	 50–59-year-old	 group,	which	 had	 an	
aggregate earnings replacement rate of 88 percent.
WORKERS	COMPENSATION	RESEARCH	INSTITUTE	
STUDY	IN	MICHIGAN
The	Workers	Compensation	Research	Institute	(WCRI)	and	the	
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research recently collaborated on a 
study of the workers’ compensation system in Michigan (Savych and 
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Hunt	2017).	The	adequacy	of	workers’	compensation	benefits,	their	
equity,	and	their	efficacy	in	promoting	return	to	work	were	assessed	
based on a 2004 sample of over 77,000 injured workers evaluated at 
the	end	of	2008	(an	average	of	4.5	years	after	injury	date).
A total of 8,781 Michigan indemnity claims from 2004 with at 
least one month of lost work time and some wage loss compensa-
tion paid were available from the Detailed Benchmark/Evaluation 
database maintained by WCRI. These claims were matched using 
propensity-score reweighting procedures against a sample of 63,887 
medical-only claims from 2004, which provided the comparison 
group for estimating what postinjury earnings would have been for 
the injured workers if they had not been injured.5 Quarterly earnings 
for	these	claimants	from	2003–2008	were	obtained	from	the	Michi-
gan Department of Energy, Labor, and Economic Growth. Earnings 
are	observed	from	4	to	7	quarters	before	the	injury	date	and	from	16	to	
19	quarters	following	the	injury	date,	depending	upon	the	actual	quar-
ter of the injury in 2004. Thus, postinjury earnings and compensation 
are observed for an average of 4.5 years, ranging from 4 to 5 years, 
depending	upon	the	specific	date	of	the	injury.
Figure 2.3 shows the average earnings for injured workers who 
receive workers’ compensation indemnity payments for at least one 
month and those who have medical-only injuries. Note that earnings 
of	the	comparison	group	peak	in	Quarter	0,	which	is	 the	quarter	of	
the	injury.	This	reflects	the	requirement	that	all	injured	workers	must	
have been working in Quarter 0 or they would not have been covered. 
Earnings	of	injured	workers	peak	one	quarter	before	the	injury	(since	
no	work	time	is	lost	in	that	quarter),	decline	rapidly	in	the	quarter	of	
injury	and	the	following	quarter,	and	then	begin	to	recover,	but	not	to	
the level of the comparison group of medical-only injuries. It is the 
gap between these two earnings lines that represents the wage losses 
that the workers’ compensation system is designed to replace.6
For the sample, the average after-tax loss of earnings following 
the	injury	is	about	$1,000	per	quarter.	And,	as	in	other	wage-loss	stud-
ies in the United States and Canada, those losses appear to be very 
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persistent	or	even	permanent	(at	least,	there	is	no	indication	of	signifi-
cant	improvement	after	five	years).	Because	only	quarterly	earnings	
data are available, we cannot tell whether the losses are the result of 
reduced labor force participation, reduced hours of work, or hourly 
wage reductions.
Because Michigan is a wage-loss state, there is no independent 
assessment of the degree of permanent impairment for injured work-
ers. All one can do is compare the amount of compensation received 
from the workers’ compensation system to the lost earnings. As a 
proxy for severity of injury, the number of weeks of wage-loss com-
pensation that are paid to the injured worker is used. An injury that 
Figure	2.3		Unadjusted	Average	Quarterly	Earnings	of	Michigan	
Workers	Injured	in	2004,	by	Quarter	from	Injury	and	
Injury Type
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Q
ua
rte
rly
 ea
rn
in
gs
 ($
 0
00
s)
 
Quarter from injury (injury in Quarter 0)
Medical-only injury Indemnity injury
NOTE: Quarterly earnings information covers the period between 2003 and 2008. 
Sample includes workers injured in Michigan in 2004. Indemnity injury sample 
includes workers who had more than one month of lost time or received lump-sum 
payments. Medical-only injury sample includes workers with medical-only injuries.
SOURCE:	Savych	and	Hunt	(2017).
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requires	more	weeks	away	from	work	is	probably	more	serious,	but	
there	may	be	other	things	that	influence	the	duration	of	disability	pay-
ments,	so	this	is	not	the	equivalent	of	an	estimate	of	residual	disability	
that would be available from an impairment system.
Table 2.4 shows the after-tax earnings replacement rates and loss 
replacement rates for all injured workers with more than one month 
of temporary total disability or a lump sum and for subgroups by 
disability duration. Both the earnings replacement rate for the aver-
age observed duration of 4.5 years and the projection of the earnings 
replacement rate out to 10 years are shown for each group. For the 
10-year	projections,	claim-specific	reserves	were	added	to	payments	
already made to estimate the total workers’ compensation payments, 
while wage losses were projected to continue at the level observed at 
the end of 2008. For all injured workers with more than one month of 
lost time, the after-tax earnings replacement rate after 4.5 years is 97 
percent, and after 10 years we estimate that it is 88 percent. Subgroup 
earnings replacement rates at 4.5 years vary from 94 to 96 percent for 
those with temporary disability compensation only, and from 91 to 95 
percent at 10 years.
This is a good deal higher than earlier U.S. studies found, but 
roughly	comparable	 to	 the	Canadian	results.	This	primarily	 reflects	
the addition of postinjury earnings to workers’ compensation pay-
ments when calculating the losses associated with the injuries. These 
earnings were not included in the same manner with workers’ com-
pensation payments in the U.S. studies, but they were in the Canadian 
studies cited. Also, most U.S. studies only included injured work-
ers with permanent partial disabilities, whereas the Michigan study 
included all injured workers with more than one month of lost work 
time. It is widely understood that compensation for permanent par-
tial injuries tends to be lower than for temporary injuries in workers’ 
compensation	programs.	This	reflects	the	disputed	elements	involved	
in such injury claims. 
Presumably, workers with what are called permanent partial 
injuries in other states would end up receiving redemption payments 
24  Table	2.4		Earnings	Replacement	and	Loss	Replacement	Rates	for	Workers	with	Indemnity	Injuries	in	Michigan	in	2004
Indemnity groups based on duration of temporary disability  
payments and receipt of lump-sum settlement
Earnings	replacement	rate	(%) Loss	replacement	rate	(%)
at 4.5 years at 10 years at 4.5 years at 10 years
All injured workers with lump sum or  > 1 month temporary  
disability
97 88 87 52
Subgroups	of	temporary	disability	duration	(no	lump	sum)
1–3	months 96 95 40 23
4–6	months 94 91 51 31
7–12	months 96 95 77 59
> 12 months 94 95 89 91
Subgroups with lump-sum settlements
Lump sum and no TD payments 30 74 57 57
Lump	sum	and	1–3	months	TD 35 85 62 71
Lump	sum	and	4–12	months	TD 49 98 67 97
Lump sum and  > 12 months TD 91 155 92 170
NOTE: Claims assessed at between 4 and 5 years after injury. This projects to 10 years based on current earnings and workers’ compensation 
payments at time of assessment plus claim reserves.
SOURCE:	Savych	and	Hunt	(2017),	Technical	Appendix	Tables	C4a	and	C4b.
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(“lump	sum”	payments)	in	Michigan,	so	it	is	relevant	to	examine	this	
group in more detail. For all claims receiving lump-sum payments, 
the average after-tax earnings replacement rate is 101 percent at 4.5 
years	(reflecting	the	impact	of	the	lump-sum	payment	some	time	dur-
ing	the	first	4.5	years).	This	falls	to	69	percent	when	projected	out	to	
10 years since the lump-sum payment will close the claim for good 
and there will be no remaining claim reserves. 
The distribution of results for lump-sum claims when includ-
ing their temporary disability payments indicates that, on average, 
those	receiving	some	TTD	were	more	adequately	compensated.	This	
probably	 reflects	 the	 high	 level	 of	 controversion	 among	 lump-sum	
claims. Those showing no temporary disability payments likely had 
their claims disputed from the start and therefore ended up with lower 
compensation overall.
Table 2.4 also reports the loss replacement rates for Michigan 
workers.	As	discussed	earlier,	 this	 is	 the	 typical	measure	of	benefit	
adequacy	that	has	been	used	in	most	previous	studies.	Except	for	the	
omission of workers with injuries that received less than one month of 
TTD, and the fact that all such indemnity claims—not just permanent 
partial disability claims—were included, these after-tax loss replace-
ment rates should be more comparable with those of other U.S. stud-
ies than the earnings replacement rates used in this study. 
With one exception, all the loss replacement rates are lower than 
the earnings replacement rates. The one exception is for claims with 
more than 12 months of TTD followed by a lump-sum settlement. 
Presumably, these injured workers at 4.5 years after the injury have 
recent lump-sum settlements. Note that the projected replacement 
rates for this group at 10 years are nearly identical for both measures.
It is interesting that the difference between the earnings replace-
ment rate and the loss replacement rate is greatest for the shortest-dura-
tion	claims.	This	sustains	our	belief	 that	 it	 is	 the	“overweighting”	of	
short-term claims that drags the aggregate loss replacement rate down.
Figure 2.4 shows the net effect of the workers’ compensation 
benefits	paid	to	injured	workers	in	Michigan.	The	total	income	from	
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earnings	 and	 income	 replacement	benefits	 (solid	 line)	 falls	 for	 two	
quarters	and	 then	begins	 to	 rise,	and	 it	actually	exceeds	 that	of	 the	
comparison	workers	 (light	 dashed	 line)	 between	 1.5	 years	 and	 2.5	
years	after	the	injury	(Quarters	6	through	10)	as	lump	sums	are	paid	
out. However, the total income of the injured workers falls rapidly 
after these payments are mostly completed, and the shortfall with 
comparison	 workers	 grows	 significantly	 after	 2.5	 years	 (Quarter	
10).	It	seems	clear	that	the	total	income	from	earnings	and	benefits	
is	headed	for	convergence	with	the	line	for	earnings	alone	five	years	
after the injury, as the vast majority of workers’ compensation ben-
efits	will	have	been	paid	out.	
Figure	2.4		Average	Quarterly	Earnings,	Workers’	Compensation	Income	
Replacement	Benefits,	and	Reweighted	Comparison	Earnings,	
by	Quarter	from	Injury,	Injuries	in	Michigan	in	2004
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Q
ua
rte
rly
 ea
rn
in
gs
 ($
 0
00
s)
 
Quarter from injury (injury in quarter 0)
Comparison (medical only)
Earnings
Earnings and income replacement benefits
NOTE: Sample includes workers injured in Michigan in 2004. Indemnity injury sample 
includes workers who had more than one month of lost time or received lump-sum 
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2003 and 2008.
SOURCE:	Savych	and	Hunt	(2017).
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CONCLUSION
It is 30 years since the initial wage-loss study by Berkowitz and 
Burton	(1987)	was	published,	but	we	continue	to	struggle	toward	a	
better	 understanding	 of	 the	 adequacy	 and	 equity	 of	workers’	 com-
pensation	benefits.	While	we	have	wage	loss	benefit	adequacy	stud-
ies from the states of California, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon, 
Washington, and Wisconsin, plus the provinces of British Columbia 
and	Ontario	in	Canada,	it	is	still	difficult	to	make	summary	judgments	
or accurate comparisons across the jurisdictions. There are several 
reasons for this. First, the workers’ compensation systems themselves 
differ substantially, both in design and in actual application. This has 
plagued research on workers’ compensation systems and limited the 
generalizability	of	any	findings.	
Second,	there	are	small	but	significant	differences	in	methodol-
ogy	between	 the	 studies,	which	 lead	 to	differences	 in	 the	findings.	
These	differences	reflect	the	specific	data	available	to	the	researchers,	
as well as honest differences of opinion about how best to measure 
benefit	adequacy	in	these	complicated	social	insurance	systems.	
Third, there are inevitable differences in interpretation of the 
findings	 that	 are	 derived	 from	 these	 studies.	 Some	 of	 these	 differ-
ences unfortunately will be interpreted as political leanings in this age 
of	political	polarization.	It	would	be	difficult	to	expect	a	social	insur-
ance system like workers’ compensation to be exempt from political 
influences	or	interpretations.
Upon	completion	of	the	multiyear	Study	Panel	on	Benefit	Ade-
quacy	 at	 the	 National	 Academy	 of	 Social	 Insurance	 more	 than	 a	
decade	ago,	the	members	of	the	panel	called	for	“additional	wage	loss	
studies	from	different	jurisdictions”	(Hunt	2004,	p.	133).	These	stud-
ies have not been forthcoming. As we have seen, in the past decade 
there have only been the two Canadian studies, one study in New 
Mexico, another in California, and the recent study from Michigan. 
The	analytical	techniques	have	certainly	been	developed	and	refined,	
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but there has been little progress in our understanding of what works 
better in a workers’ compensation system and why. It appears to us at 
this	time	that	there	is	insufficient	interest	in	the	answer	to	the	ques-
tion,	“Are	workers’	compensation	benefits	adequate	and	equitable?”	
It is possible that recent discussions, prompted by a series of articles 
published	in	ProPublica	(e.g.,	Grabell	and	Berkes	2015a,b),	may	raise	
the	interest	sufficiently	to	start	a	movement	in	this	direction.	
Our review indicates that the Michigan wage-loss workers’ com-
pensation	system	seems	to	provide	better	benefit	adequacy	than	other	
U.S. systems that use the impairment method of compensation. But 
Michigan’s is not as good as some Canadian systems for injured 
workers. Unfortunately, we cannot discern whether this is due to 
the wage-loss principle upon which the Michigan system is based or 
some	other	factor.	Theoretically,	one	would	expect	a	benefit	system	
based on actual wage loss experienced, rather than a medical diag-
nosis of impairment or an estimate of loss of wage-earning capacity, 
to yield more accurate earnings replacement results at the individual 
level. And this does seem to be the case. 
The Michigan system appears to be performing as designed, and 
it also demonstrates increasing replacement rates for more serious 
injuries, which may represent an element of social welfare thinking. 
Workers who are more seriously injured, but not seriously enough to 
qualify	 for	Federal	SSDI	benefits,	may	have	 fewer	 income	mainte-
nance	options	and	may	not	be	able	to	respond	to	a	financial	incentive	
that promotes return to work. 
Short-duration workers’ compensation claims show the impact 
of	the	waiting	period	(effectively	a	copay	for	injured	workers),	which	
suppresses replacement rates for such claims. But such claims also 
achieve	very	high	return-to-work	rates	and	quickly	achieve	near	par-
ity of earnings with those who did not lose any work time (medical-
only	claims).
The	findings	from	the	Michigan	study	indicate	that	taking	account	
of	the	postinjury	earnings	of	injured	workers	makes	a	significant	dif-
ference	in	judgments	about	benefit	adequacy.	That	is,	earnings	replace-
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ment	 rates	 are	 significantly	 “more	 adequate”	 than	 loss	 replacement	
rates for the Michigan system as well as some Canadian provinces. 
Furthermore, we believe that this is a preferable way to analyze 
benefit	 adequacy,	 particularly	 for	 temporary	 disabilities,	 since	 the	
societal goal is to return the injured worker to productive employment 
with minimal disruption. Using earnings replacement rates rather 
than	loss	replacement	rates	reflects	this	policy	focus.	It	also	highlights	
the distinction between injured workers who need temporary support 
while they recover from their injuries and those who will likely not 
recover and need permanent support. 
It	 is	difficult	 to	explain	what	 seems	 to	be	a	permanent	drop	 in	
earnings	 among	 injured	 workers	 who	 file	 workers’	 compensation	
claims. This has been found in all the wage loss studies to date and 
confirmed	in	the	WCRI	interview	studies	of	worker	outcomes	(Savych	
and	Thumula	2016).	Apparently,	injured	workers	suffer	some	kind	of	
“separation	effect”	similar	to	that	of	economically	displaced	workers.	
This could be due to supply factors such as changed preferences for 
income and work, or to demand factors such as discrimination by 
employers against workers’ compensation claimants. This is a subject 
that clearly deserves more investigation.
Concerns	 remain	 about	 the	 adequacy	 of	 lump-sum	 redemption	
payments in Michigan to sustain injured workers over the remain-
der of their lives, but our analysis shows better outcomes than those 
previously reported for other U.S. states. However, average earnings 
replacement rates decline from 95 percent at 4.5 years to 67 percent 
at 10 years, even with knowledge of the claim reserves held by the 
workers’ compensation insurers in Michigan. 
So	are	 the	Michigan	workers’	compensation	benefits	adequate?	
That perception still remains largely in the eye of the beholder. The 
finding	that	both	earnings	replacement	rates	and	loss	replacement	rates	
are higher in Michigan than in other U.S. states that have been studied 
is	 encouraging,	 and	 it	 raises	 questions	 about	 the	 unique	 aspects	 of	
the Michigan system. Are wage-loss systems inherently superior in 
replacing	lost	earnings?	Or	is	this	finding	due	to	the	specific	method-
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ology	adopted	for	this	study?	Only	more	such	studies	of	other	states	
with different methodologies can tell us. We sincerely hope that such 
studies will be forthcoming in the near future. 
Notes
		1.	 See	the	extensive	discussion	of	the	issue	of	adequacy	in	Hunt	(2004),	
Chapter 2.
			2.	 However,	there	are	also	five	states	(including	Michigan)	that	use	a	for-
mula based on spendable earnings, which is gross earnings less esti-
mated taxes based on family size, and seven states that use some other 
percentage of gross earnings (three at 60 percent, three at 70 percent, 
and	one	at	72	percent).	See	WCRI	(2014),	Table	4.
  3. Contested cases are those in which the employer or insurer disputes 
either the work-relatedness or the level of the disability. These cases 
generally	 require	 an	 administrative	 hearing	 and	 usually	 feature	 legal	
counsel for both sides. Disputed cases usually involve more severe dis-
abilities and are considerably more expensive.
		4.	 Loss	of	earnings	benefits	were	still	available	in	circumstances	that	were	
“so	exceptional”	as	to	create	undue	hardship	under	the	loss-of-functional- 
capacity evaluation method.
		5.	 This	 sample	 represents	 about	 one	 quarter	 of	 the	 indemnity	 claims	 in	
Michigan.	See	WCRI	(2014)	for	discussion	of	the	representativeness	of	
the Michigan Detailed Benchmark/Evaluation sample.
  6. This is not strictly correct, since the Michigan workers’ compensation 
system	uses	a	benefit	 formula	 that	aims	 to	 replace	80	percent	of	pre-
injury	spendable	earnings,	subject	to	a	maximum	benefit	at	90	percent	
of the state average weekly wage. Thus, the system uses the preinjury 
wage as the standard and does not aim to replace 100 percent of lost 
earnings. However, since the adoption of the comparison-worker ana-
lytical model to estimate lost earnings after the injury, it has become 
routine to think of the gap between the postinjury earnings of injured 
workers and the comparison group as the target for the system.
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Chapter 3
The Challenge of 
Return to Work in Workers’ 
Compensation Programs
Among the many goals of workers’ compensation programs (pre-
vention,	compensation,	rehabilitation,	etc.),	the	most	recent	to	emerge	
into	public	policy	concern	has	been	the	goal	of	return	to	work	(RTW),	
which can be regarded as the ultimate objective of medical care and 
rehabilitation services after disability resulting from an industrial 
injury or illness. One could argue that this is the best measure of the 
value of the social systems that deal with work-related disability—
namely,	 restoring	 the	person	 to	 the	previous	status	quo.	Preventing	
injuries and illness is paramount; compensating the individuals ade-
quately	while	healing	and	rehabilitation	 take	place	 is	critical;	but	a	
return to gainful employment has the potential to allow the injured 
worker	to	resume	her/his	productivity	and	quality	of	life.
For	most	of	the	first	century	of	workers’	compensation	programs	
in the United States, the RTW goal was either left to the parties them-
selves or managed by the system of vocational rehabilitation that 
was also included within these statutory programs. Trained voca-
tional rehabilitation professionals evaluated the level of impairment, 
designed programs for rehabilitation, and assisted injured workers 
back to gainful employment. However, the length of treatment and 
the	outcomes	 achieved	were	 frequently	not	 found	 sufficient	 to	 jus-
tify the cost, and many workers’ compensation agencies have moved 
away from dependence on formal systems of vocational rehabilitation 
(Gardner	1985).
As health care costs rose in an increasingly challenging busi-
ness climate in the 1980s and 1990s, greater emphasis was placed 
by employers on gaining control of the process after injury and ill-
ness	claims	occurred.	This	chapter	will	explore	research	findings	and	
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policy initiatives that address the return-to-work goal explicitly. It 
will highlight early research efforts at the Upjohn Institute that helped 
to document the potential of disability prevention and management 
through analysis of survey data on workers’ compensation claims in 
Michigan.1 And it will provide several examples of state workers’ 
compensation policy initiatives that have developed to support the 
return-to-work goal.
DETERMINANTS	OF	RETURN	TO	WORK
Clearly, the determinants of return to work are multidimensional; 
they include medical treatment, rehabilitative services, employer poli-
cies,	injured	worker	characteristics,	job	requirements,	and	many	other	
factors. The failure to achieve the return-to-work goal arises from the 
multiplicity of these contributing causes for disability, perhaps com-
pounded	 by	 a	 general	 excess	 supply	 of	 labor,	which	 can	 influence	
employer behavior in hiring and retention decisions.2
Obviously, there are important medical issues, such as the type 
and severity of the injury, resulting functional impairments and pos-
sible comorbidities, timely access to effective treatment and rehabili-
tation,	and	many	others,	 that	will	 influence	 the	 recovery	as	well	as	
what kind of work can be performed after a work injury or illness. 
In addition, personal factors of the injured worker come into play. 
Beyond the possibility of impaired work skills and productivity, there 
are	family	circumstances	and	social	influences,	including	the	attitudes	
and beliefs of fellow workers, the workplace culture, and the very real 
fear of potential reinjury.
There are also institutional determinants impacting RTW, such 
as employer policies and practices, workers’ compensation disputes 
and settlements, insurer behavior, and labor relations. Labor market 
dynamics also play a role when an excess supply of labor creates 
highly	competitive	conditions	in	the	labor	market,	or	when	deficient	
demand	due	 to	 recession	 reduces	 the	 chance	of	finding	 an	 alterna-
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tive job. The employer-at-injury may have suffered business reverses, 
leaving the injured worker with limited alternative work options, or 
left out completely and subject to the vagaries of the general labor 
market. 
There are also policy causes of failure to return to work. One 
possibility	 is	 that	 an	 injured	worker	might	 qualify,	 or	 think	 she/he	
will	qualify,	 for	 social	 insurance	benefits	other	 than	workers’	 com-
pensation.	This	could	make	returning	to	work	to	meet	financial	obli-
gations seem unnecessary, or a less appealing alternative. The largest 
disability compensation program in the United States is the Social 
Security	Disability	 Insurance	 (SSDI)	program,	 administered	by	 the	
Social Security Administration and funded by the Old Age, Survivors, 
and	Disability	Insurance	(OASDI)	payroll	tax	system.	Theoretically,	
there should be very little overlap between workers’ compensation 
and	SSDI	populations	because	 the	severity	of	disability	required	 to	
qualify	for	SSDI	is	very	high	(disability	expected	to	last	more	than	
one	 year	 or	 result	 in	 death).	 This	 would	 rule	 out	 all	 but	 the	most	
severely disabled of workers’ compensation claimants (less than 2 
percent	of	the	total).	
O’Leary	et	al.	(2012)	estimate	that	7	percent	of	new	SSDI	awards	
in	 the	 state	 of	 New	 Mexico	 result	 from	 workers’	 compensation– 
covered injuries or diseases. Strikingly, the impact of a compensable 
lost-time injury on the likelihood of SSDI receipt some years later 
is	about	the	same	as	aging	by	10	years	(p.	12).	Assuming	that	these	
empirical estimates from New Mexico are representative of the nation 
as a whole, there would be as many as 70,000 new SSDI awards to 
former	workers’	compensation	beneficiaries	every	year.	So	the	rela-
tive magnitudes suggest that transitioning to SSDI may be fairly com-
mon for seriously disabled workers’ compensation claimants.3
However,	a	full	understanding	of	the	requirements	for	SSDI	eligi-
bility	is	not	widespread,	so	injured	workers	may	believe	they	qualify	
for	benefits	when	they	actually	do	not.	The	exact	line	between	meet-
ing	and	not	meeting	the	requirements	in	the	SSDI	disability	listings	
can be somewhat mystifying, leading to considerable uncertainty 
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about	 who	 will	 qualify	 and	 to	 pervasive	 legal	 representation	 and	
administrative litigation. Standards also appear to vary somewhat in 
their application in different states, as it is a state government agency 
that makes the initial determination as to which cases are eligible.4 
Thus, seriously injured workers who have used up their workers’ 
compensation	 benefits	 or	 private	 disability	 benefits,	 or	who	 expect	
to do so, may mistakenly regard SSDI as a potential alternative or 
supplement	to	workers’	compensation	benefits	for	work-related	inju-
ries and illnesses.5
Disabled workers who become impoverished may also be eligi-
ble for state and local welfare assistance and/or federal Supplemental 
Security	Income	(SSI)	benefits.	So	while	there	are	a	variety	of	sources	
of income for work-injured employees, none of them provide full 
earnings	replacement	or	the	typical	package	of	benefits	that	accom-
pany	most	full-time	jobs.	Still,	they	should	be	considered	a	significant	
policy factor affecting RTW outcomes for workers’ compensation 
programs.
Likely the biggest barriers to RTW are the private decisions 
made by employers and employees in our employment-at-will labor 
markets. Employers may decide that they do not want to employ an 
injured individual any longer. If the ADA or other antidiscrimination 
statute does not come into play, that is their right. Employees may 
decide that they would prefer not to return to their at-injury job. No 
doubt both of these decisions are very common. The fact that they 
have	not	been	studied	sufficiently	reflects	the	difficulties	involved	in	
researching such private and multidimensional decisions rather than 
a lack of public interest.6
The	magnitude	 of	 the	RTW	problem	 has	 been	 quantified	 by	 a	
unique	series	of	 interview	studies	of	 injured	workers.	The	Workers	
Compensation	Research	Institute	(WCRI)	conducted	studies	of	com-
pleted samples of about 400 workers in each of 15 states (Arizona, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennes-
see,	Virginia,	and	Wisconsin)	over	the	period	2013–2015.	All	of	these	
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injured workers missed at least seven days of work because of their 
injury. They were interviewed by telephone between 2.8 and 3.0 years 
after their injury. Table 3.1 shows the range of RTW results among 
the	15	states,	but	more	significantly	the	high	proportion	who	were	not	
working	 about	 three	 years	 later	 “predominantly	 due	 to	 the	 injury.”	
Those who were not working at the time of the interview ranged from 
11 to 19 percent, and those who had never returned to work for more 
than 30 days since the injury ranged from 9 to 19 percent. These num-
bers are concerning. In addition, from 6 to 11 percent of those who 
had	returned	to	work	reported	that	they	were	earning	“a	lot	less”	than	
before the injury, which further demonstrates the magnitude of labor 
market problems encountered by injured workers.7
Last,	 among	 those	 who	 had	 returned	 to	 work	 “successfully,”	
meaning for at least 30 days, between 19 and 37 percent had different 
job duties with the at-injury employer predominantly because of the 
injury, and between 2 and 10 percent had a new employer because of 
the	injury	(Savych	and	Thumula	2016).
While these are somewhat subjective measures gleaned from an 
interview study, they indicate the degree of labor market disruption 
created by a compensable injury in a typical state. Adding those who 
reported that they earned a lot less to those who were no longer work-
ing,	we	get	 a	figure	of	 18	 to	27	percent	 of	workers’	 compensation	
wage-loss	 claimants	 who	 were	 still	 suffering	 significant	 economic	
loss nearly three years after their injury, the major cause for this being 
lack of employment. It is worth noting that these results are roughly 
comparable to those for dislocated workers whose employers have 
closed	completely	(Jacobson,	LaLonde,	and	Sullivan	1993).
The	Emergence	of	Disability	Management	as	an	RTW	Solution
During the 1980s and 1990s, largely in response to the spiraling 
costs of workers’ compensation insurance, larger corporate employ-
ers	began	to	adopt	techniques	that	came	to	be	collectively	known	as	
“disability	management.”	Disability	management	refers	to	the	set	of	
36  Table 3.1  Return-to-Work Performance in 15 States
AR CT FL GA IN IA KY MA MI MN NC PA TN VA WI
% not working three years after 
injury, predominantly because 
of the work injury
16 15 14 17 11 13 17 17 12 12 19 17 16 13 12
% who never returned to work for 
30 days within three years after 
the work injury
15 12 14 19 9 14 18 14 9 11 15 15 15 13 10
% working at interview who 
reported	earning	“a	lot	less”	
because of the injury
8 8 11 8 8 9 7 9 7 11 8 8 8 7 6
NOTE: Based on samples of about 400 workers in each of 15 states. Telephone interviews were conducted from 29 to 40 months after a com-
pensable injury involving at least seven days of lost work time.  State response rates ranged from 25 to 31 percent, and the interviews were 
conducted in three phases—eight states in 2013, four states in 2014, and three states in 2015. 
SOURCE:	Savych	and	Thumula	(2016),	Tables	3.2	and	3.5.
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practices designed to minimize the disabling impact of injuries and 
health conditions that arise during the course of employment. This 
includes better medical management, more accommodation of exist-
ing limitations, and other such efforts to prevent work disability. 
Disability management is not the same as accident prevention, 
but rather is broadly focused on preventing the development of work 
disability that can follow an initial injury or disease, or on ameliorat-
ing the effects of such disability. This might include changing hours 
of	work,	altering	work	assignments,	redesigning	specific	work	tasks,	
or other accommodations that make it possible for the impaired indi-
vidual to return to work despite his or her impairment. Disability man-
agement	 is	 also	much	 broader	 than	 just	 return-to-work	 techniques,	
but it includes all of those policies and practices that are designed to 
minimize the impact of disability in the workforce.
Disability Management, the classic work by Akabas, Gates, and 
Galvin	(1992),	provided	the	following	definition:	“Disability	manage-
ment is a workplace prevention and remediation strategy that seeks to 
prevent disability from occurring or, lacking that, to intervene early 
following the onset of disability, using coordinated, cost-conscious, 
quality	rehabilitation	service	that	reflects	an	organizational	commit-
ment to continued employment of those experiencing functional work 
limitations”	(p.	2).
Disability	management	is	 time-specific,	because	it	relates	to	an	
individual during a particular period of time, and it is employer based, 
because employers generally control the conditions of employment. 
Workers’ compensation insurers also practice disability management 
as a method of loss control and service to their employer clients. 
Disability management supports a win-win philosophy, which 
can	 result	 in	 substantial	 benefits	 for	 both	 employer	 and	 employee.	
The injured worker returns to employment sooner and suffers less 
loss of earnings, as well as very possibly a lower likelihood of perma-
nent disability. The employer gets less production interruption, lower 
costs of replacement labor, and likely lower workers’ compensation 
costs	due	to	less	time	off	work,	resulting	in	lower	benefit	payments.8
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Figure 3.1 shows the decline in injuries and diseases with days 
away from work and the commensurate increase in days of restricted 
work	activity,	as	measured	by	the	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	(BLS)	
Survey	of	Occupational	 Injuries	 and	 Illnesses	 (SOII).	These	 trends	
appear	to	reflect	the	spread	of	disability	management	in	U.S.	private	
industry. In the context of a rapidly declining OSHA-reported injury 
rate, the number of cases with days away from work as a result of 
injury or disease has declined continuously since the late 1980s. 
The incidence rate of lost-workday cases has declined by more 
than 50 percent since 1985. Yet the number of restricted-work cases 
increased at least through 2000, ultimately approaching 42 percent 
of the number of cases with days away from work (Ruser and Wiat-
rowski	2013).	While	there	is	no	direct	measurement	of	the	effect,	it	
seems likely that an increasing percentage of all OSHA-recordable 
Figure 3.1  National Trends in Rates Associated with Lost Workdays 
(rates	per	100	full-time-equivalent	workers),	Private	
Industry, 1976–1997
SOURCE:	Ruser	(1999).
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cases in the U.S. private sector may be experiencing some application 
of disability management aimed at reducing days away from work, 
and this is manifested in the rising proportion of restricted-work cases.
Upjohn	Institute	Research	on	Impacts	of	Disability	Management
The Upjohn Institute began work on these issues under two 
research contracts with the Michigan Department of Labor, beginning 
in	1987	and	ending	in	1993.	The	first	project,	funded	by	the	Michigan	
Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation, sought to explain the 
wide differences among employers in claim rates for workers’ com-
pensation	benefits.	Analyzing	administrative	data	that	showed	varia-
tion of more than tenfold in workers’ compensation claim rates, it was 
found that these differences were only partially explained by indus-
try,	size	of	firm,	and	location	(only	about	25	percent	of	the	variance	
was	explained	by	these	factors).	Also,	high-claim	firms	had	twice	as	
many accidents but four times as many workers’ compensation claims 
(Hunt	1988).	This	raised	the	question	of	whether	 there	were	differ-
ences in policies and practices of employers that might explain the 
differences in performance, and this policy and practice dimension 
was probed in a second study with sponsorship from the Bureau of 
Safety and Regulation of the Michigan Department of Labor.
The Michigan Disability Prevention Study was a collaborative 
effort between the Upjohn Institute, Michigan State University, and 
the	Bureau	of	Safety	and	Regulation	(Hunt	et	al.	1993).9 A mail sur-
vey	(which	achieved	a	46	percent	response	rate)	of	a	random	sample	
of 220 Michigan establishments with more than 100 employees from 
seven industry groups (Food Production SIC 20, Furniture Manufac-
turing SIC 25, Rubber and Plastics SIC 30, Fabricated Metals SIC 34, 
Nonelectrical	Machinery	SIC	35,	Transportation	Equipment	SIC	37,	
and	Health	Services	SIC	80)	was	conducted	 in	1991.	The	 research	
team had access to the administrative records for workers’ compensa-
tion	claims	for	these	firms	as	well.
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Figure 3.2 displays the conceptual model that guided the proj-
ect. The model sees the company environment as being determined 
by	dimensions	like	“people-oriented	culture”	and	“safety	leadership”	
and mediated by policies of health promotion, safety intervention, 
and	disability	management	techniques.	The	result	is	a	specific	level	of	
disability prevention and management performance, as measured by 
accident incidence, disability incidence, and disability duration (Hunt 
et	al.	1993,	Fig.	1).
The study correlated differences in self-reported achievement of 
relevant	policy	and	practice	dimensions	with	firm	performance	on	dis-
ability outcome measures. The policy and practice dimensions were 
developed	from	an	intensive	literature	search,	with	review	and	refine-
ment by a group of expert advisers. From a total of 228 relevant con-
cepts	identified	in	the	literature,	139	were	selected	for	possible	scale	
development. After pilot testing and further expert consultation, a total 
of	95	items	in	eight	scales	(determined	through	factor	analysis)	were	
incorporated	in	the	Organizational	Policies	and	Practices	(OPP)	sur-
vey	 instrument	 (Habeck,	Hunt,	 and	VanTol	 1998).	The	 eight	 scales	
were	labeled	1)	People-Oriented	Culture,	2)	Active	Safety	Leadership,	
3)	Safety	Diligence,	4)	Safety	Training,	5)	Disability	Case	Monitor-
ing,	6)	Proactive	RTW	Program,	7)	Wellness	Orientation,	and	8)	Ergo-
nomic Solutions.10
Variation	 in	firm	self-reported	achievement	of	 these	policy	and	
practice dimensions was correlated with outcome measures, includ-
ing the OSHA recordable incident rate per 100 employees, the lost 
workday case rate per 100 employees, the workers’ compensation 
wage-loss claim rate per 100 employees, and the total lost workdays 
per	100	employees	(Habeck,	Hunt,	and	VanTol	1998).
Three	multivariate	models	were	estimated	 reflecting	 the	under-
lying conceptual model. The Prevention Model estimated the effect 
of preinjury policies and practices	in	reducing	the	frequency,	sever-
ity, and duration of disability resulting from work-related injuries 
and diseases. The Disability Management Model estimated the role 
of policies and practices that occur after the injury in reducing the 
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Figure 3.2  Conceptual Model of Disability Prevention among Michigan 
Employers
SOURCE:	Hunt	et	al.	(1993).
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occurrence, the severity, and the duration of disability. The Manage-
rial	Model	estimated	the	influence	of	the	specific elements of the com-
pany environment on their injury and disability experience.
In each case, the measures were scaled, so the effect of a 10 
percent	 difference	 in	 an	 independent	 variable	 (policy	 and	practice)	
was expressed in the percentage difference in each dependent vari-
able	(disability	outcome).	The	multivariate regression estimates also 
controlled	for	structural	variables	like	employment	level	of	the	firm,	
multiple-site	firms,	union	presence,	self-insurance,	and	wage	level.
The	 significance	 of	 this	 early	 study	 was	 in	 its	 analytical	 and	
design rigor combined with simplicity in presentation. It was not dif-
ficult	for	employers	to	understand	that	10	percent	better	performance	
in Safety Diligence was associated with a 6.6 percent lower incidence 
of OSHA recordables and a 16.6 percent lower level of lost workday 
cases (Habeck, Hunt, and VanTol 1998).	In	fact,	this	study	led	to	great	
interest from employers who wanted to improve their performance on 
disability prevention and lower their workers’ compensation costs. 
Extensive outreach efforts were conducted by the research team and 
by the Michigan Bureau of Safety and Regulation.
Overall,	 the	 empirical	 results	 confirmed	 that	 employer	 policy	
and practice dimensions like People-Oriented Culture, Active Safety 
Leadership, Safety Training, Safety Diligence, Disability Case Moni-
toring, and Proactive Return to Work were very effective in explaining 
differences	among	Michigan	firms	in	the	incidence	of	lost	workday	
cases, workers’ compensation claims, and total lost workdays. And 
while	this	was	a	cross-sectional	study	of	different	firms	at	a	particu-
lar	point	in	time,	findings	were	widely	interpreted	as	indicating	that	
these	policy	and	practice	dimensions	offered	firms	the	opportunity	to	
improve their performance through time.
Research has continued using the organizational policies and 
practices	scale	(OPP),	developed	in	the	Michigan	study,	and	deriva-
tives of that scale. Ben Amick at the Institute for Work and Health 
(IWH),	located	in	Toronto,	Ontario,	conducted	a	study	of	198	work-
ers with carpal-tunnel-release surgery claims in Maine (Amick et al. 
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2000).	Other	studies	include	a	study	of	65	manager-worker	pairs	in	
Ontario (Ossman et	al.	2005)	and	a	study	of	188	health	care	work-
places	 in	Ontario	 (Williams	et	al.	2007).	The	 results	of	 these	addi-
tional	studies	have	strongly	confirmed	 the	 relationship	between	 the	
OPP variables and workplace outcomes.
Subsequently,	an	abbreviated	version	of	the	organizational	poli-
cies and practices survey was incorporated into the Ontario Lead-
ing	 Indicators	Project	 (OLIP),	which	has	been	used	 to	 survey	over	
2,000 workplaces in Ontario since 2011. More recently, an even more 
abbreviated	version	of	the	OPP	was	field	tested	by	the	Workers’	Com-
pensation	Board	of	the	Province	of	New	Brunswick	(WorkSafeNB).	
After a study of about 250 employers, WorkSafeNB adopted the tool 
to use in its Focus Firm program,	which	targets	firms	with	high	work-
ers’	compensation	claim	frequency	for	their	industry.	So	the	practical	
usefulness	of	the	research	concepts	has	been	confirmed	in	their	adop-
tion by public agencies as well as private employers.
Other	Empirical	Research	on	Return	to	Work
With funding from the California Commission on Health and 
Safety	and	Workers’	Compensation	(CHSWC),	 the	RAND	Institute	
for Civil Justice has conducted several major studies of workers’ 
compensation, including the return-to-work dimension. In a working 
paper,	McLaren,	Reville,	and	Seabury	(2010)	reported	the	estimated	
difference in the number of weeks before return to work between 
large	firms	with	a	return-to-work	program	and	those	without	such	a	
program.
They	found	four	major	return-to-work	techniques	in	use	by	their	
sample	firms:	 1)	modified	work	 tasks,	 2)	modified	work	 station	 or	
equipment,	3)	reduced	work	time	and	schedule	changes,	and	4)	trans-
fer to a different job. The results, based on a nonrandom survey of 
40 large, self-insured employers in California in the year 2000, are 
shown	 in	Table	 3.2.	These	 firms	 reported	 huge	 impacts	 of	 disabil-
ity management programs, in the range of 40 percent shorter median 
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durations	with	a	RTW	program	in	place	(columns	1	and	2).	This	result	
held	for	all	injuries	as	well	as	for	permanent	partial	disability	(PPD)	
cases. The mean differences were almost as large, which is surprising 
since long-duration claims would seem to be less amenable to dis-
ability management treatments.
Using statistical models to control for characteristics of the 
employer	(columns	2	and	4)	reduced	the	size	of	these	effects	some-
what, but very large differences remain. According to the authors, 
“Our	findings	suggest	that	return	to	work	programs	are	highly	effec-
tive	when	adopted	at	large,	self-insured	firms.	.	.	.	Future	work	should	
study how return to work programs can be implemented effectively at 
small	firms”	(McLaren,	Reville,	and	Seabury	2010,	p.	S-7).
Franche	et	al.	(2005)	at	the	IWH	conducted	a	systematic	review	
of	the	quantitative	literature	on	workplace-based	return-to-work	inter-
ventions covering published literature from 1990 through 2003. They 
identified	more	 than	4,000	papers	 in	English	and	French	published	
during	 the	 period.	A	 total	 of	 35	 studies	 were	 deemed	 quantitative	
in nature, and 10 of these studies, producing a total of 23 scholarly 
publications,	met	their	quality	appraisal	criteria.11 Four of the studies 
came	from	Canada	 (from	 three	different	provinces),	 three	 from	 the	
United	States	(three	different	states),	and	one	each	from	Finland,	the	
Netherlands, and Sweden.
Table	3.2		Estimated	Improvements	in	Weeks	before	RTW
All workers PPD claims
No	fixed
 effects
Fixed 
effects
No	fixed	
effects
Fixed 
effects
Weeks to RTW  
without program
9.0
(41.1)
8.9
(40.8)
39.7
(69.5)
35.5
(65.2)
Difference with  
program
−3.8
(−15.7)
−3.6
(−15.1)
−18.8
(−25.9)
−12.6
(−17.6)
Median	change	(%) −42.2 −40.4 −47.4 −35.5
Mean	change	(%) −38.2 −37.0 −37.3 −27.0
NOTE:	Columns	show	median	number	of	weeks	(means	in	parentheses).
SOURCE:	Adapted	from	McLaren,	Reville,	and	Seabury	(2010).
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Data were extracted from these 10 studies and subjected to evi-
dence synthesis analysis.
Three	key	quantitative	outcome	dimensions	were	used	to	assess	
the	 impact	 of	 disability	 management	 activities:	 1)	 work	 disability	
duration,	2)	associated	costs,	and	3)	quality-of-life	outcomes.	The	dis-
ability management activities included early contact with the worker, 
work accommodation offer, contact with a health-care provider, ergo-
nomic	visits	to	the	work	site,	replacement	staffing,	and	RTW	coordi-
nation.	Findings	were	summarized	as	follows:	“There	was	strong	evi-
dence	that	work	disability	duration	is	significantly	reduced	by	work	
accommodation offers and contact between healthcare provider and 
workplace; and moderate evidence that it is reduced by interventions 
which include early contact with the worker by the workplace, ergo-
nomic	work	site	visits,	and	presence	of	RTW	coordinator”	(Franche	
et	al.	2005,	p.	623).
Table 3.3 shows the distribution of disability management inter-
ventions and outcomes. It seems that effects of disability management 
on	quality	of	life	of	the	injured	worker	are	not	strong.	However,	all	
other activities garner at least moderate evidence of impact on work 
disability duration and the costs associated with work disability. This 
constitutes	 a	 strong	empirical	validation	of	 employer	benefits	 from	
disability	management	techniques.	Similar	positive	results	have	been	
reported	in	other	survey	articles,	including	Tompa	et	al.	(2008)	and	
van	Oostrom	et	al.	(2009).
Table	3.3		Effect	of	Return-to-Work	Programs	on	Duration	of	Work	 
Disability
Intervention component
Effect on dis-
ability duration Cost
Effect on  
quality	of	life
Early contact by the workplace Moderate Moderate Mixed
Work accommodation offer Strong Moderate Mixed
Contact with health provider Strong Moderate Mixed
Ergonomic work site visit Moderate Moderate Mixed
Presence of RTW coordinator Moderate Moderate Insufficient
SOURCE:	Adapted	from	Franche	et	al.	(2005),	p.	623.
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Another approach is represented by a recent set of studies from 
the Stay-at-Work/Return-to-Work Policy Collaborative between 
Mathematica	 Policy	 Research	 (MPR)	 and	 the	 Office	 of	 Disability	
Employment	Policy	(ODEP)	of	the	U.S.	Department	of	Labor	(Bardos	 
et	al.	2015).	MPR	simulated	the	private	and	public	costs	and	benefits	
of returning a disabled worker to the job versus replacing that worker. 
In such a comparison, it is clear that both the disabled worker and the 
federal	government	will	 experience	 substantial	financial	gains	over	
the worker’s remaining working life if the disabled worker can be 
returned	to	work.	The	employer’s	financial	return	depends	critically	
on the productivity comparison between the disabled worker and the 
replacement worker.
In	their	conclusion,	Bardos,	Burak,	and	Ben-Shalom	(2015)	raise	
the possibility of the government providing federal subsidies for lost 
productivity due to disability. They believe this is likely to be more 
effective than subsidizing the rather minimal costs of workplace 
accommodations in promoting RTW.12
Based upon our own experience, we believe it is clear that dis-
ability management can prevent or reduce the duration of many work-
ers’ compensation claims. It also seems clear that larger employers 
with	generous	benefit	packages	find	that	disability	management	pro-
grams	further	the	interests	of	both	the	firm	and	its	employees.	What	
may	not	yet	be	clear	is	whether	these	techniques	can	be	effectively	
applied	in	smaller	firms	with	more	modest	benefit	packages	and	fewer	
administrative resources.13 However, as will be shown in the next sec-
tion, policymakers in several states have been convinced that pro-
moting return to work is in the public interest, and they have proven 
to be highly innovative in designing approaches to encourage RTW 
programs.
Public Policy Measures to Promote Return to Work
Because of the perceived payoff to disability management tech-
niques	 and	 return-to-work	programs,	 especially	 among	 larger,	 self-
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insured employers, several workers’ compensation jurisdictions in 
the United States have sought to promote such programs with public 
policy initiatives.14 We will review several of these in some detail, but 
a	brief	overview	is	useful	first.	These	policies	have	fallen	into	one	or	
more of the following approaches:15
Medical Management–Based Methods
Medical	management–based	methods	seek	to	improve	the	medi-
cal management of work injuries with the objective of reducing lost-
time, residual-disability, and employer costs. One successful exam-
ple is the Washington Department of Labor and Industries program 
called	Centers	of	Occupational	Health	and	Education	(COHE).	This	
began as an experiment in two areas of the state and has proven suf-
ficiently	successful	to	have	been	expanded	to	the	entire	state	by	the	
2011 legislative reforms to the workers’ compensation system. COHE 
is an attempt to increase the availability of specialized occupational 
medicine personnel and provide priority medical treatment to injured 
workers. A full-scale evaluation of the program at the two pilot sites, 
published in 2011, found that injured workers who were treated by 
health	care	providers	affiliated	with	a	COHE	lost	20	percent	 fewer	
days from work. COHE treatment was found to reduce total medical 
and	disability	costs	by	$510	per	claim	in	the	first	year	after	the	injury	
(Wickizer	et	al.	2011).
With more recent expansions from two to four and then to six 
COHEs, performance has slipped only slightly. According to an April 
24,	2014,	briefing,	the	statistics	show	a	4.1	day	reduction	in	time	loss	
per	claim,	and	savings	of	$480	 in	 the	first	year.	The	projected	ulti-
mate	savings	per	COHE	claim	are	approximately	$1,600	(Washington	
State	Department	of	Labor	and	Industries	2014b).
Methods based on medical management also include treatment 
guidelines	for	specific	conditions	and	attempts	to	improve	informa-
tion and communication among medical professionals, insurers, 
employers, and injured workers and their representatives.
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Incentive-Based Methods
Incentive-based methods attempt to provide monetary incen-
tives for employers or workers to minimize the time lost from work. 
The most striking adoption of this method was in California, which 
in	2004	established	 separate	 tiers	of	wage-replacement	benefits	 for	
permanent disability claims, depending upon whether the at-injury 
employer	made	a	qualifying	employment	offer	to	the	injured	worker.	
If the employer made such an offer, and the injured worker declined 
to	accept	the	offer,	weekly	benefits	would	be	reduced	by	15	percent.	
If	no	qualifying	job	offer	was	made	by	the	employer,	weekly	benefits	
would be increased by 15 percent (California Department of Indus-
trial	Relations	2014).
Another approach to incentives is illustrated by the Oregon 
Employer-at-Injury	Program	(EAIP).	Employers	are	offered	a	wage	
subsidy of up to 50 percent for two months if they take an injured 
worker	back	under	modified	work	provisions.	There	is	also	the	pos-
sibility	of	a	subsidy	to	offset	 the	cost	of	 job	or	work-site	modifica-
tions	required	to	make	such	an	offer.	In	addition,	when	workers	are	
not able to return to their jobs in the short term but have permanent 
work restrictions, another program called the Preferred Worker Pro-
gram	 (PWP)	 can	 provide	 a	 50	 percent	wage	 subsidy	 for	 up	 to	 six	
months and exemptions from workers’ compensation premiums for 
that worker for three years (Oregon Department of Consumer and 
Business	Services	2015).
Accommodation-Based Methods
Particularly since the passage of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act	(ADA)	in	1990,	which	requires	accommodation	of	disabilities	by	
any	employer	with	more	than	15	employees	unless	it	causes	“undue	
hardship”	for	the	employer,	accommodation	has	become	much	more	
common, including among disability management programs for 
workers’ compensation.
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Accommodation to promote employment or return to work for 
injured workers can encompass reduction in hours, change in work 
assignment,	job	rotation,	specific	job	modifications,	and	other	similar	
methods	that	promise	to	improve	the	worker’s	fit	with	the	demands	of	
employment. Since full implementation of the ADA in 1992, failure 
to accommodate a disability leaves the employer open to a potential 
civil lawsuit with treble damages, unless accommodating the disabil-
ity will cause undue hardship for the employer.
The ADA prevents employers from discriminating against cur-
rent or prospective employees based on disability, in cases where 
“disability”	means	one	of	the	following	three	things:
	 1)	 A	physical	or	mental	impairment	that	substantially	limits	a	
major life activity
	 2)	 A	 record	 of	 such	 an	 impairment	 (which	might	 include	 a	
workers’	compensation	claim)
3)		 Being	regarded	as	having	such	an	impairment16
It seems clear that many compensable workers’ compensation 
injuries	would	give	rise	to	a	disability	under	the	ADA	definition,	but	
certainly not all claims would. Generally, workers’ compensation 
claims that are designated as permanent partial or permanent total 
disability claims would probably all potentially be subject to the ADA 
(Flynn	and	Bruyere	2001).
But the legal mandate for accommodation under the ADA should 
not divert attention from the return-to-work potential and cost-saving 
improvements that drive the disability management movement. 
It should concentrate rather than divert the employer’s attention in 
dealing with work-related disability. We fear that the employer could 
become concerned with building a record that will withstand legal 
scrutiny under the ADA rather than trying to maximize the productiv-
ity	of	the	injured	worker	for	successful	and	mutually	beneficial	RTW	
outcomes.
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Productivity-Based Methods
There is also another approach that has been associated with 
vocational rehabilitation: providing the injured worker with training 
sufficient	to	support	a	new	occupation	in	which	any	residual	impair-
ment	will	 be	 less	of	 an	 issue.	This	 can	be	 thought	of	 as	 a	 “supply	
side”	 approach	 to	 accommodating	 work	 disability.	Workers’	 com-
pensation programs have supported this vocational rehabilitation 
approach to a greater or lesser extent over the years. However, as in 
workforce	development	programs,	the	quicker	and	less	expensive	job	
placement approach based on existing transferable skills has become 
dominant. This approach can be expected to lead to lower wages on 
average, even if the injured worker can be returned to the original at-
injury employer. Training is needed to effectively rehabilitate injured 
workers. 
However, it is clear that encouraging employer-based disability 
management and RTW is now preferred public policy in many states. 
Whether through economic incentives or government mandate, ask-
ing	the	“job	creators”	to	find	ways	to	work	around	individual	impair-
ments	and	restore	injured	workers	to	employment	is	now	the	“state	
of	the	art.”	But	there	is	a	wide	range	of	policy	devices	for	encourag-
ing such practices among employers, and we will review some of 
the most noteworthy examples here, beginning with the pathbreaking 
policies in Oregon.
Some	Examples	of	State	Policy	Initiatives	to	Encourage	Return	
to Work
To determine how prevalent employer-based return-to-work pro-
grams are in workers’ compensation programs, the Upjohn Institute 
used LexisNexis to survey legislative enactments or administrative 
rules that mandated or supported such return-to-work programs. We 
found a multiplicity of approaches that explicitly support private-
sector employers in efforts to get injured workers back on the job 
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after a compensable injury or disease. Some real-world examples are 
illuminating.
Oregon
Oregon	 was	 the	 first	 program	 to	 directly	 incentivize	 employ-
ers to take injured workers back. Beginning in 1987, under pressure 
to reduce the costs of workers’ compensation programs in Oregon, 
the legislature enacted several measures that dealt with the return-
to-work	issue.	The	Preferred	Worker	Program	(PWP)	was	begun	in	
1987 to provide wage subsidies, premium exemption, claim cost 
reimbursement, and accommodation cost support for permanently 
disabled workers’ compensation claimants who were unable to return 
to their regular jobs because of their injuries. This was accompanied 
by a scaling back of the traditional vocational assistance program in 
Oregon. Workers with permanent work-related disabilities receive an 
identification	card	that	informs	prospective	employers	that	the	worker	
is eligible for a possible 50 percent wage subsidy for up to six months, 
work-site	modification	expense	support,	and	exemption	from	work-
ers’ compensation premiums on that worker for three years. There is 
no	time	limit	on	claiming	PWP	benefits	in	Oregon.
In	1993,	the	better-known	“Employer-at-Injury	Program”	(EAIP)	
was added to provide 50 percent wage subsidies for up to three months 
for employers of disabled employees engaged in light duty or transi-
tional	work	assignments.	Work-site	modification	and	other	expenses	
connected with return to work were also covered. The costs of these 
programs	are	paid	by	the	Workers’	Benefit	Fund,	which	is	supported	
by joint contributions from workers and employers. The assessment 
rate has been 3.3 cents per hour since 2013, with half (1.65 cents 
per	hour)	coming	from	the	employer	and	half	from	the	worker.	This	
fund also supports cost-of-living adjustments for long-term perma-
nent total disability claimants (Oregon Department of Consumer and 
Business	Services	2014).
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Utilization of these programs has varied with economic condi-
tions	 through	 the	 years.	 In	 2013,	 the	EAIP	 benefit	 costs	were	 $22	
million,	while	the	PWP	cost	was	about	$6	million.	In	2014,	over	25	
percent of accepted disabling claims had used one or more of the 
RTW programs within four years after the claimants’ injuries—i.e., 
since 2010. In 2013, the Oregon Department of Workers’ Compen-
sation approved support for 9,085 placements with 2,143 separate 
employers (Oregon Department of Consumer and Business Services 
2015).	Oregon	also	maintains	a	sophisticated	follow-up	system	that	
uses	quarterly	administrative	earnings	records	to	compare	the	earn-
ings of disabled workers against earnings of medical-only claims for 
13	 quarters	 (just	 over	 three	 years)	 after	 the	 injury.	These	 statistics	
make it possible to measure the impact of these programs.
In 2014, for the cohort of accepted disabling claims from 2010, 
those who used any of the RTW programs were 8 percentage points 
more likely to be employed than those with similar injuries who did 
not use the programs. The advantage in wage recovery was even 
greater, at 14 percentage points. On average, those who used the RTW 
programs recovered to 100 percent of their preinjury wages, even 
controlling for statewide upward trends in wages and employment 
(Oregon	Department	of	Consumer	and	Business	Services	2015).17 
Note that the EAIP is aimed primarily at workers with temporary 
disabilities, while the PWP is for those with permanent disabilities 
who still have some work potential. For more severely disabled work-
ers, Oregon still offers its Vocational Assistance Program. This pro-
gram	provides	traditional	vocational	rehabilitation	benefits	for	those	
who are permanently disabled and unable to achieve reemployment 
at 80 percent of their previous wage level. In 2013, only 377 work-
ers	qualified	for	these	benefits	(Oregon	Department	of	Consumer	and	
Business	Services	2015).
The Challenge of Return to Work   53
Washington
Next door to Oregon, Washington legislators adopted the Wash-
ington Stay at Work Program in 2011 as part of a negotiated reform 
package for this exclusive state fund insurance system.18 For eligible 
employers, beginning in mid-2012, wage reimbursement of 50 per-
cent of base wages is available for up to 66 days, or a maximum of 
$10,000	per	claim	of	 light-duty	or	 transitional	employment.	 If	 it	 is	
necessary for the employer to incur any expenses to accommodate 
the	injured	worker’s	unique	needs,	reimbursement	is	available	for	up	
to	$1,000	for	training	fees	or	materials,	up	to	$2,500	for	special	tools,	
and	up	to	$400	for	special	clothing	required.
More importantly, the Department of Labor and Industries cre-
ated	 Early	 Return	 to	 Work	 teams	 in	 local	 administrative	 offices	
around	the	state.	When	a	time-loss	claim	exceeds	14	days	of	benefits,	
the claim is automatically referred to the Early Return to Work team 
in	the	nearest	office.	The	mission	of	the	team	is	to	facilitate	commu-
nication between injured workers, health care providers, and employ-
ers, with the objective of exploring return-to-work options.
While we are not aware of any empirical evaluations of this pro-
gram	as	yet,	the	utilization	has	grown	rapidly	in	the	first	two-and-a-
half years to involve 3,000 employers, 12,000 injured workers, and 
$27	million	in	reimbursements	for	2014.	L&I	reports	that	the	system	
savings	 from	 the	 reform	package	 (including	Stay	at	Work)	 reached	
$91	million	in	2014,	substantially	exceeding	the	original	projections	
(Washington	State	Department	of	Labor	and	Industries	2014a).
New	Hampshire
New	Hampshire	offers	a	version	of	the	rehiring	requirement	for	
injured	workers.	All	employers	with	five	or	more	full-time	employ-
ees	 “shall	 provide	 temporary	 alternative	 work	 programs	 to	 bring	
injured	 employees	 back	 to	 work”	 (New	Hampshire	 General	 Court	
2016,	 Chapter	 Lab	 504.04[a]).	 Furthermore,	 the	 rules	 specify	 that	
54   Hunt and Dillender
transitional	“means	the	duty	elements	are	variable	as	the	employee’s	
work	 capacity	 increases”	 (Lab	 504.04[b]).	 Employers	 are	 required	
to	“develop	an	outline	of	each	position	that	details	present	require-
ments	 and	 essential	 functions	 of	 each	 job	within	 the	 organization”	
(Lab	504.04[d])	and	provide	the	treating	physician	with	the	outline	
and	task	analysis	as	soon	as	possible	after	the	injury	(Lab	504.04[f]).	
Finally,	the	“employer	shall	offer	a	position	as	approved	by	the	treat-
ing physician and the employee shall demonstrate a reasonable effort 
to	comply”	(Lab	504.04[g]).
These	provisions	are	supported	by	“joint	loss-management	com-
mittees”	that	are	required	as	well.	This	provision	relates	to	employers	
of 15 or more employees in the state of New Hampshire. While these 
committees are primarily concerned with safety and health issues, 
they	are	also	charged	to	“assist	with	the	identification	and	definition	
of	temporary,	alternate	tasks”	in	support	of	the	return-to-work	objec-
tive	(New	Hampshire	General	Court	2016,	Lab	603.02[i]).
New	Mexico
The State of New Mexico has followed a similar if less aggressive 
approach.	Effective	in	2013,	they	imposed	a	limited	rehiring	require-
ment	for	employers,	in	which	the	former	employee	“is	receiving,	has	
received,	or	is	due	to	receive	benefits	under	the	workers’	compensa-
tion	act.”	 If	 the	 injured	worker	 applies	 for	her/his	 former	 job,	or	 a	
modified	similar	job,	and	the	employer	is	hiring,	“that	employer	shall	
offer to rehire a worker who applies for any job that pays less than the 
preinjury	job,	provided	that	the	worker	is	qualified	for	the	job	and	that	
the	treating	health	care	provider	certifies	that	the	worker	is	fit	to	carry	
out	the	job	offered”	(New	Mexico	Compilation	Commission	2013).
Massachusetts
An imaginative program with a very different approach is the 
Qualified	 Loss	 Management	 Program	 (QLMP)	 for	 assigned	 risk	
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(residual	market)	employers	in	Massachusetts.	In	1990,	facing	a	rap-
idly expanding residual market for employers who could not secure 
workers’ compensation insurance in the regular voluntary market, 
the Massachusetts legislature adopted a program for residual mar-
ket employers that provided premium credits for those adopting dis-
ability	management	 techniques.	A	 premium	credit	 (i.e.,	 in	 advance	
of	performance)	of	up	to	10	percent	was	offered	to	employers	who	
would	 engage	 a	 certified	 consultant	 to	 implement	 a	 “loss	 control	
management”	program.	Furthermore,	this	credit	could	be	maintained	
for up to three years, provided the loss control program continued in 
effect for the employer. However, the third year only carried 50 per-
cent of the credit, as the goal was to improve employer performance 
and	depopulate	the	assigned	risk	pool.	Subsequently,	based	upon	the	
results	for	the	first	three	years,	the	program	was	expanded	to	a	fourth	
year, with 25 percent of the original credit available in year four. In 
addition, the maximum premium credit was increased to 15 percent to 
provide even more incentive for employers.
Most interesting as a program design element, the actual size of 
the premium credit is determined by the average credit factor assigned 
to	the	loss	management	firm,	not	the	employer’s	actual	performance.	
Provided	the	loss	management	firm	certifies	full	QLMP	participation,	
the performance improvements of other	 firms	 actually	 provide	 the	
basis for the premium credit. So the system is built upon the assump-
tion that disability management practitioners can replicate their aver-
age	loss	management	performance	in	any	firm.
According to an evaluation done in 1999, the program produced 
immediate	and	sustained	benefits	for	participating	employers.	In	the	
first	 year	 of	 the	 program	 (September	 1990	 through	August	 1991),	
QLMP participants showed 13 percent more improvement than non-
participating employers in the loss ratio (ratio of incurred losses to 
standard	premium)	at	first	report	(after	18	months	of	experience).	In	
the second year, the same cohort of employers showed 36 percent 
improvement, and in the third year, 40 percent improvement over 
nonparticipating employers.
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Furthermore, these results held up through second (30 months 
of	 experience)	 and	 third	 report	 (42	months	of	 experience)—i.e.,	 as	
claims	matured	 over	 time	 (Mahler	 and	Blomstrom	1999,	Table	 3).	
So there was clearly an improving result over time for participating 
employers, which would seem to validate the program design.
This innovative program is still in effect in Massachusetts (see 
www.wcribma.org	for	more	details),	and	was	subsequently	emulated	
to a greater or lesser degree in workers’ compensation systems in 
West Virginia, New Hampshire, and Missouri.
New York
New York has adopted yet another approach. In 2009, the Work-
place Safety Incentive Programs were implemented. These are vol-
untary programs for employers with annual workers’ compensation 
premiums	of	 at	 least	 $5,000	 and	 an	 experience	 rating	modification	
under	1.3.	This	means	 they	have	a	payroll	of	over	$250,000	and	a	
workers’	compensation	claim	frequency	that	was	worse	than	average,	
although	 still	 not	 too	 bad.	 Such	firms	 can	 participate	 in	 three	 pro-
grams:	1)	a	Safety	Incentive	Program,	2)	a	Drug	and	Alcohol	Preven-
tion	Program,	and	3)	a	Return	to	Work	Program.
The	program	specifications	dictate	that	“an	acceptable	Return	to	
Work Program facilitates an employee’s return to work as soon as 
medically	 possible	 after	 a	 job-related	 injury	 or	 illness”	 (New	York	
State	Insurance	Fund	2012).	All	three	programs,	referred	to	as	“Code	
Rule	60”	programs,	reward	employers	who	participate	with	credits	on	
their workers’ compensation policy premiums. The credit is 4 percent 
the	first	 year,	 reduced	 to	2	percent	 thereafter,	 and	 is	 renewable	 for	
three years at a time. It is interesting that the New York State Depart-
ment of Labor evaluates the application and issues the incentive, 
which then must be honored by the insurer. Services under the Return 
to Work Program may be provided by the employer, jointly by the 
employer and the union, by the union itself, or by an outside provider. 
Procedures for ensuring the involvement of the injured employee, a 
The Challenge of Return to Work   57
designated representative of the employee, and the treating physician 
are	required	(New	York	State	Department	of	Labor	2016).
Ohio
Another interesting application of disability management prin-
ciples has been adopted as policy in Ohio, another state with an exclu-
sive fund system. The Health Partnership Program began in 1993. 
This is a managed care program originally designed to improve medi-
cal care for injured workers in Ohio. It has evolved more recently into 
a full disability management program with extensive support avail-
able	from	the	Ohio	Bureau	of	Workers’	Compensation	(BWC).19
Ohio’s	 disability	 management	 program	 (“Remain	 at	 Work”)	
offers	 a	 full	 range	of	 services,	which	 can	be	financed	with	 a	 grant	
from the Ohio BWC, resulting in a low-cost way for employers to 
gain control of their future workers’ compensation costs. In addi-
tion,	the	Ohio	BWC	offers	a	premium	discount	program	(“PDP+”),	
which offers up to a 30 percent reduction in the employer’s workers’ 
compensation	premium.	It	requires	the	implementation	of	a	10-step	
“Safety	and	Health	Business	Plan.”	This	plan	must	reduce	the	claims	
frequency	and	severity	for	the	employer	by	15	percent	to	achieve	the	
maximum premium discount.
Ohio	is	also	rather	unusual	in	publishing	a	“report	card”	on	man-
aged-care	organizations	(MCOs)	operating	in	Ohio.	The	current	ver-
sion reports the following:
• the number of policies assigned to the MCO
• the number of claims in hand at the end of the year
• timing	of	the	first	report	(average	number	of	days	between	the	
date	of	injury	and	claim	filing	with	the	BWC)
• first-report	 turnaround	 efficiency	 (the	 number	 of	 days	 from	
receiving the notice of injury from the employer to the date 
the	claim	is	filed	with	the	BWC)
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• the days absent compared to the statewide average, and the 
“recent	medical”	charges	(excluding	claims	in	the	days-absent	
measure)	compared	to	the	statewide	average	(Ohio	Bureau	of	
Workers’	Compensation	2014)
The Ohio BWC publishes these performance statistics on the 
MCOs	who	 are	 operating	 in	 the	 state	 (currently	 16	 in	 number)	 on	
their website annually, enabling comparisons by employers shopping 
for these services.
Unfortunately,	an	evaluation	of	this	program	finds	that	the	addi-
tion of a performance bonus payment to the program in 1995, as well 
as	the	specific	rules	around	payment	of	bonuses,	partially	undermined	
the	intention.	In	the	final	analysis,	the	managed	care	organizations	in	
Ohio were incentivized to reduce the duration of short-term claims 
but increase the duration of more serious claims to take them out of 
the	performance	measurement	(McInerney	2010).
California
The	state	of	California	has	struggled	with	both	poor	adequacy	of	
benefits	for	injured	workers	and	poor	affordability	for	employers	for	
some	time	(Boden,	Reville,	and	Biddle	2005).	In	2004,	the	legislature	
attempted to tackle their perceived problems with a number of pro-
visions, including a substantial reduction in the level of permanent 
disability	benefits.	There	was	also	an	explicit	attempt	to	improve	the	
return-to-work performance in California.
For employers of at least 50 employees, the statute varies perma-
nent	partial	disability	benefits,	depending	upon	a	return-to-work	offer.	
If the employer, within 60 days of the condition becoming permanent 
and	 stationary,	makes	 an	 offer	 of	 regular	work,	modified	work,	 or	
alternative work for a period of at least 12 months, the permanent par-
tial	disability	benefit	is	reduced	by	15	percent,	regardless	of	whether	
the employee accepts or rejects the offer. Contrarily, if the employer 
does	not	make	such	an	offer,	the	permanent	partial	disability	benefit	
is increased by 15 percent.
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This	unique	“bump-up/bump-down”	provision	was	in	effect	from	
2005 through 2012. However, it was used sparingly because the tim-
ing	of	the	“permanent	and	stationary”	decision	on	the	claim	made	it	
impractical	to	administer.	In	the	final	analysis,	employers	and	insurers	
pronounced	 it	 “unworkable”	 (Seabury	 et	 al.	 2011,	pp.	19–20).	The	
provision was repealed in 2013.
For small employers—those with fewer than 50 employees—
the legislature created a more traditional return-to-work program. 
This program provided subsidies for small employers who incurred 
expenses	 for	 work-site	 modifications,	 equipment,	 furniture,	 tools,	
or other items necessary to accommodate work restrictions of the 
injured worker. This program, however, was largely ignored by Cal-
ifornia employers. According to one source, in the years 2007 and 
2008, there were only 36 applications for reimbursement under this 
program,	of	which	11	were	granted,	 for	a	 total	of	 less	 than	$9,000	
in expenditures (California Commission on Health and Safety and 
Workers’	Compensation	2009).
An additional complication in California comes from the Fair 
Employment and Housing Act, which provides protections for indi-
viduals with disabilities that limit a major life activity and applies to 
employers	with	more	than	five	employees.	While	this	is	a	civil	rights	
law and provides potentially unlimited tort damages, including puni-
tive damages, it was likely beginning to have more traction at about 
the same time that the return-to-work provisions were added to the 
workers’ compensation law in California (Seabury et al. 2011, pp. 
28–30).
Seabury	et	al.	(2011)	conclude	that	changes	in	the	Fair	Employ-
ment	and	Housing	Act	that	made	it	easier	for	injured	workers	to	file	a	
claim	may	have	played	a	significant	causative	role	in	improving	RTW	
results. It is also possible that medical treatment improvements may 
have	contributed.	In	addition,	they	allow	that	“another	possibility	is	
that the improvement was driven endogenously by the problems with 
the	system”	(p.	68).	Things	got	so	bad	in	California	that	employers	
were forced to pay attention to their spiraling costs of workers’ com-
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pensation. One of the responses was likely improved attention to dis-
ability	management	techniques.
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, there is no consistent measure of return-to-work 
across all state workers’ compensation programs, and there is no 
definitive	 source	 that	 tells	 how	much	 performance	 on	 this	 critical	
dimension may have improved. However, while the OSHA incidence 
of cases with days away from work has been steadily declining since 
the late 1980s, the number of restricted-work cases increased steadily 
from the mid-1980s through at least 2000. So the clear implication 
is that disability prevention and management programs, which use 
restricted	work	and	other	techniques	to	reduce	time	lost	from	work,	
have been expanding over the past 30 years. Since their focus is to 
reduce lost workdays and improve the transition back to work, it 
is logical to believe that overall performance on return to work has 
improved, especially if there is evidence that more and more employ-
ers are using such programs.
But the WCRI worker outcome surveys as well as the studies of 
benefit	adequacy	demonstrate	that	a	significant	minority	of	claimants	
do not return to work successfully following a compensable injury. 
In addition, average indemnity cost per lost-time claim has increased 
rapidly,	at	4.8	percent	a	year	from	1995	to	2012	(Antonello	2014).	In	
the	absence	of	substantial	increases	in	benefit	rates,	which	have	not	
been seen during this period, this implies a rising average duration for 
workers’ compensation indemnity claims, referred to by the NCCI as 
rising	“severity.”
One	possible	explanation	for	this	trend	has	been	called	“the	small	
potatoes	effect.”	It	is	unlikely	that	disability	management	techniques	
will have much impact on a really serious injury, as opportunities to 
accommodate or ameliorate will be minimal, at least until consider-
able healing has taken place. But less serious injuries allow maximum 
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scope for such interventions, thereby reducing both the incidence 
and duration of relatively short-term disabilities. This can cause an 
increase in the average duration because of the elimination or reduc-
tion	of	the	“smaller,”	less	expensive	claims.	It	is	one	of	the	truisms	for	
employers that engage in aggressive disability management that their 
average measured duration of workers’ compensation claims will 
likely increase because the less serious injuries are no longer there to 
be	counted.	It	is	also	true	that	the	“burden”	of	claiming	is	relatively	
high	for	minor	 injuries,	making	 it	more	attractive	 to	“absorb”	such	
claims with wage continuation, vacation time, employer-sponsored 
health insurance, or other mechanisms. 
The growing capability of employers, especially large employers, 
to prevent workers’ compensation claims during the last three decades 
seems obvious. There is some debate about the extent to which such 
efforts result in improved performance for the worker versus claim 
suppression	and	cost	savings	for	 the	employer	(Young	et	al.	2005).	
But the picture is clear—many employers are managing their work-
ers’ compensation claims more effectively. Many injured workers are 
realizing better outcomes as well, especially when the less serious 
injuries	that	do	not	qualify	for	wage-loss	benefits	are	included.	While	
all states have not rushed in with programs to support these efforts, 
there is enough legislative activity among the states, and enough 
diversity in program approach and dimension, to demonstrate that this 
is an emerging area of workers’ compensation policy as well.
The lessons learned from this experience seem obvious in hind-
sight.	First,	it	is	clear	that	disability	management	techniques	do have 
the potential to remove many barriers to work and thereby reduce the 
incidence of lost workdays. This means reduced workers’ compensa-
tion costs for the employer, but also improved chances that an injured 
worker will suffer less wage loss from a shorter period of disabil-
ity. This likely makes it easier to maintain her/his lifestyle during the 
period of the disability. Maintaining the connection with work also 
increases the likelihood of a successful recovery from the injury or 
disease. Given that the same accommodation and amelioration tech-
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niques	could	be	applied	to	persons	with	disabilities	that	did	not	result	
from work injury, there could be a bonus for employers in dealing 
with their responsibilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
as well.20
Second, it is now obvious that the relationship between the at-
injury employer and the injured worker is critically important through 
the healing and recovery process. Once that connection is lost, the 
worker’s chances of returning to work drop precipitously, and the 
trajectory	 of	 lifetime	 expected	 earnings	 is	 significantly	 lowered.21 
There is no practical alternative to basing return-to-work efforts in the 
employment relationship. Many years of experience with vocational 
rehabilitation	programs	 show	 that	 it	 is	 exponentially	more	difficult	
and more expensive to achieve an alternative employment placement 
for individuals who have lost their connection with the original at-
injury employer.
Third, while there are some concerns about employers using 
disability management	 techniques	 to	discourage	or	 resist	 legitimate	
workers’	compensation	claims,	that	does	not	seem	a	sufficient	reason	
to	 restrict	 or	 prevent	 the	 use	 of	 such	 techniques.	And	 the	 fact	 that	
employers	using	 these	 techniques	are	 able	 to	 reduce	 their	workers’	
compensation costs does not make this a bad deal for workers. In fact, 
improving return-to-work performance with disability management 
techniques	constitutes	a	genuine	win-win	situation	for	employers	and	
their employees.
Notes
		1.	 We	use	the	term	“disability	prevention	and	management”	to	reference	
a	proactive,	employer-based	approach	to	do	three	things:	1)	prevent	the	
occurrence	 of	 accidents	 and	work-related	 disability,	 2)	 provide	 early	
intervention	services	for	health	and	disability	risk	factors,	and	3)	foster	
coordinated administrative and rehabilitative strategies to promote cost-
effective	restoration	and	return	to	work.	 	See	Habeck	et	al.	(1991),	p.	
212.
			2.	 See	Baldwin,	Conway,	and	Huang	(2009)	and	Galizzi	and	Boden	(2003)	
for empirical investigations of some of these causes.
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			3.	 See	Guo	and	Burton	(2012)	for	a	careful	study	of	the	influence	of	work-
ers’ compensation programs on the rate of applications to SSDI.
			4.	 See	Coe	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 for	 an	 investigation	 of	 state	 variation	 in	 SSDI	
applications and awards.
		5.	 The	 relationship	 between	benefit	 payments	 from	workers’	 compensa-
tion and SSDI depends upon the jurisdiction. By federal law, combined 
benefits	from	workers’	compensation	and	SSDI	are	limited	to	80	percent	
of the preinjury wage level.  In 15 states, workers’ compensation ben-
efits	are	reduced	or	offset,	while	in	35	states	it	is	the	other	way	around	
and	SSDI	benefits	are	reduced	while	workers’	compensation	benefits	are	
maintained.
		6.	 But	see	Burkhauser,	Butler,	and	Kim	(1995)	for	an	early	contribution.	
  7. There was no measurement of voluntary labor force withdrawal, so 
these	figures	include	all	those	who	chose	to	quit	working	or	were	forced	
out by their employer. While the respondents did indicate that their labor 
force	status	“was	predominantly	due	to	the	injury,”	that	does	not	exclude	
the possibility that the injury caused them to retire early. Whether this is 
a	“voluntary”	retirement	is	open	to	debate.
		8.	 It	 is	also	true	that	the	methods	of	“disability	management”	have	been	
used by some employers as a way to pressure workers to go back to 
work before they are ready, or even to persuade them not to claim work-
ers’	compensation	benefits,	and	generally	to	take	advantage	of	injured	
workers.
 9. The full research report is available on the Upjohn Institute website at 
http://research.upjohn.org/up_technicalreports/4/.
 10. The scales and their items are included in Appendix A of the original 
research	report,	Hunt	et	al.	(1993).
  11. This includes the Michigan Disability Prevention Study, described 
earlier.
		12.	 For	a	broader	view	of	reemployment	options,	see	Hollenbeck	(2015).
		13.	 It	is	well	established	that	the	closer	personal	connections	in	small	firms	
lead to many of the same methods being applied to prevent separation 
of employees after accident or injury.
 14. There are also a small number of states that have mandated RTW by 
requiring	 the	employer	 to	 take	 the	 injured	worker	back	under	 certain	
circumstances. 
 15. The various methods described on the following four pages come from 
McLaren,	Reville,	and	Seabury	(2010).
 16. Americans with Disabilities Act, Title I.
 17. This does not mean that such results would be available to all, as there 
is likely some preselection involved in such programs. 
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 18. Washington has a Preferred Worker Program as well.  Note that Wash-
ington also collects workers’ compensation premiums from workers, 
primarily	to	support	medical	aid	benefits.		Worker	contributions	account	
for	approximately	one	quarter	of	total	system	costs	for	the	state	fund	in	
Washington.
 19.   See www.ohpinc.com for more information.
	20.	 See	Gifford	and	Parry	(2016)	for	evidence	on	occupational	and	nonoc-
cupational claims. 
	21.	 See	Galizzi	and	Boden	(2003)	and	Baldwin,	Conway,	and	Huang	(2009).
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Chapter 4
Workers’ Compensation and 
Incentives for Preventing Injuries
Work-related injuries and diseases are costly for both workers and 
firms.	 For	workers,	 injuries	 can	 interfere	with	 the	 ability	 to	work,	
thus lowering current and future income.1 Work-related injuries are 
also associated with depression and anxiety (Asmundson et al. 1998; 
Dersh	et	al.	2002)	and	may	lead	to	chronic	pain.	For	firms,	injuries	
to workers disrupt production schedules, increase labor costs, and 
have the potential to increase workers’ compensation costs. Injuries 
are	also	costly	to	firms	if	firms	value	their	workers’	health	and	happi-
ness for nonmonetary reasons or feel that injuries lower morale and 
productivity.	According	to	Leigh	(2011),	the	total	cost	of	work-related	
injuries	 in	 the	United	 States	 in	 2007	was	 $250	 billion,	which	was	
more	 than	 the	cost	of	cancer	 ($219	billion),	coronary	heart	disease	
($152	billion),	or	stroke	($62	billion).	
While	preventing	all	work-related	injuries	is	not	possible,	firms,	
workers, and the government can all reduce their likelihood through 
workplace	 safety	 choices.	 Firms	 choose	 safety	 equipment,	 safety	
training, safety protocol, how much to spend on a safety department, 
and the method of production. Workers choose their safety effort and 
whether to follow the safety protocol. The federal government moni-
tors workplace safety through the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration	(OSHA)	and	sets	fees	for	noncompliance,	while	many	
state governments have separate OSHAs that perform similar func-
tions. State-level governments also set workers’ compensation policy. 
All levels of government can provide information on safety, mandate 
that	firms	use	certain	equipment	or	follow	certain	guidelines,	or	sub-
sidize	firms	for	following	certain	practices.
In 1970, the Occupational Safety and Health Act set up a National 
Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws to evaluate 
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workers’ compensation laws. The commission issued a report that 
identified	promoting	 safety	as	one	of	 the	main	objectives	of	work-
ers’	 compensation.	Workers’	 compensation	 programs	 can	 influence	
work-related safety in at least three ways. One is that they can provide 
preventive consultation services to employers and workers. A second 
is that they can provide general information about safety. And third, 
they can alter monetary incentives for safety, which is the focus of 
this chapter. In this chapter, we explain how workers’ compensation 
programs can affect safety incentives, and we provide an overview of 
the empirical literature on the safety impacts of workers’ compensa-
tion programs.
THE	ROLE	OF	WORKERS’	COMPENSATION	IN	 
OPTIMAL	SAFETY
The cost of injuries goes beyond medical expenses, disrupted 
productivity, and lost wages. Injuries are also costly because they 
cause pain and suffering and because the inability to work can harm 
a worker’s psyche. From a societal standpoint, an injury should be 
prevented if the social cost of the prevention efforts is lower than the 
social cost of the injury. The cost of injuries includes their numerous 
deleterious effects on workers and their families in addition to all of 
their monetary costs. Although injuries clearly have random elements, 
through prevention efforts the various stakeholders have the ability to 
lower the probability that they occur. Prevention efforts should be 
undertaken if the cost of the prevention efforts is lower than the cost 
of the injury multiplied by how much the injury probability is lowered 
by the prevention efforts. In theoretical economic models with per-
fect information, no frictions, and actuarially fair insurance, workers’ 
compensation insurance is unnecessary—optimal safety levels will 
be achieved through worker sorting based on job risk and individuals 
purchasing	insurance	(Rosen	1974;	Thaler	and	Rosen	1976).
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According	to	these	economic	models,	firms	differ	in	their	inherent	
risks	of	injuries	but	can	influence	the	probability	of	injuries	through	
spending on safety. Workers differ in their baseline health endow-
ments and in their risk tolerance but can lower their injury probability 
by	 spending	more	 effort	 on	 safety	 or	working	 for	 a	 safer	 firm.	To	
induce	workers	to	accept	a	job,	firms	that	engage	in	risk-filled	work	
have to pay workers more than they would earn at less risky jobs. 
Economists call this extra payment to accept a risky job a compensat-
ing differential. Since workers with higher risk tolerances need less of 
a compensating differential, they choose riskier jobs than risk-averse 
workers.
The	fact	that	firms	have	to	pay	compensating	differentials	for	the	
risks	their	workers	face	provides	firms	with	safety	incentives,	because	
they can lower the wages they have to pay workers by making their 
jobs	 safer.	 Each	 firm	 has	 the	 incentive	 to	 improve	 safety	 until	 the	
cost of improving it is more than the worker values the extra safety.2 
Although workers’ compensation insurance is unnecessary in these 
models, optimal safety will still be achieved with workers’ compensa-
tion	insurance	as	long	as	firms	are	perfectly	experience	rated,	which	
means	their	premiums	reflect	their	past	claims.	If	firms	are	not	per-
fectly	experience	rated,	higher-risk	firms	will	be	implicitly	subsidized	
by	 lower-risk	 firms,	 which	will	 lead	 to	 a	 suboptimal	 allocation	 of	
resources	(Ehrenberg	1988).
In reality, the assumption of perfect information is not met in the 
determination of workplace safety for a variety of reasons (Fortin and 
Lanoie	2000).	Firms	 and	 insurers	 cannot	 always	 accurately	predict	
the	incidence	of	injuries,	while	workers	and	firms	may	be	incorrect	
in	their	estimates	of	occupational	risk	and	of	their	own	influence	on	
the level of risk. Employers and insurers cannot effectively monitor 
employees’	precautions,	and	insurers	cannot	monitor	firms’	preven-
tion	efforts	perfectly.	Insurers	and	firms	may	not	be	able	to	determine	
whether an injury is work related or even whether the worker is truly 
injured.	In	addition,	experience	rating	is	not	practical	for	small	firms	
in reality, because a large claim could still put them out of business. 
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The assumption that workers could buy insurance on their own that 
meets their needs and is actuarially fair is not realistic either.
Moreover, some speculate that injured workers sometimes use 
other disability insurance or have health insurance cover some costs 
of work-related injuries. Access to these other insurance programs 
lessens	the	negative	consequences	of	an	injury	and	means	that	work-
ers	and	firms	will	not	focus	enough	on	safety.	As	a	result,	more	inju-
ries occur than would if information were perfect, and work-related 
injuries impose extra costs on society.3
THE	IMPACT	OF	THE	INTRODUCTION	OF	WORKERS’	
COMPENSATION	ON	SAFETY
Prior to workers’ compensation programs being enacted in the 
early twentieth century, work-related injuries were addressed by 
worker mutual aid organizations and through the tort system. Under 
the tort system, workers who were injured on the job and were seeking 
compensation had to prove in court that their employers’ negligence 
caused their injuries. An employer could avoid a negligence ruling by 
showing that the worker’s actions contributed at least partially to the 
injury, that the injury was an inherent job risk, or that the careless-
ness of coworkers contributed to the injury. Because many industrial 
injuries were caused by seemingly inherent dangers of work, fault 
was	difficult	to	assign	under	this	system	(Fishback	and	Kantor	1996).	
As a result, workers rarely won their suits. When workers did win, 
the	resulting	awards	reduced	the	financial	stability	of	firms	and	were	
sometimes	large	enough	to	shut	down	firms.
In systems with negligible transaction costs and perfect infor-
mation, liability rules have no impact on the allocation of resources 
(Chelius	1976).	But	as	has	been	already	discussed,	information	asym-
metries abound with work-related injuries. The assumption of no 
transaction cost is not met under the tort system either, because law-
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suits are expensive. Therefore, safety was suboptimal under the tort 
system.
Given that most people tend to be risk averse, they would prefer 
reliable payments after injuries rather than the rare possibility of a 
large	payout.	By	making	 the	consequences	of	work-related	 injuries	
less severe for workers, the introduction of workers’ compensation 
programs theoretically decreased safety incentives for workers on 
average.	 For	 firms,	 safety	 under	 workers’	 compensation	 programs	
versus	the	tort	system	is	less	clear.	If	firms	are	risk	neutral,	they	would	
prefer whichever system had the lowest expected payout. Since pay-
outs were lower on average under the tort system (Fishback and 
Kantor	1996),	injuries	would	be	cheaper	for	firms	under	the	liability	
system than through workers’ compensation. Thus, workers’ compen-
sation	would	likely	increase	safety	incentives	for	risk-neutral	firms.	
However,	 the	many	firms	 that	are	 too	 small	 to	be	 risk	neutral	may	
prefer workers’ compensation insurance to the tort system, since one 
large payout could force them out of business. 
Most research on the safety effects of workers’ compensation 
programs has focused on changes to various aspects of the programs 
rather than on what the introduction of the workers’ compensation 
system did to safety levels, which means that the effect of switch-
ing from a tort system to workers’ compensation on safety levels 
remains	an	open	question	(Morantz	2010).	The	research	that	exists	on	
the safety effects of the shift to workers’ compensation reports mixed 
results.	Although	Chelius	 (1976)	finds	 that	 the	passage	of	workers’	
compensation laws in the early twentieth century reduced non-motor-
vehicle	deaths,	Fishback	(1987)	finds	that	the	introduction	of	work-
ers’ compensation to coal mining resulted in a rise in fatal accidents, 
because workers’ compensation increased the median compensation 
award, which presumably led to workers’ being less safe.
Butler	 and	 Worrall	 (2008)	 argue	 that	 workers’	 compensation	
improves	safety	when	firms	are	the	low-cost	providers	of	safety	but	
reduces safety when workers are the low-cost providers of safety. 
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They study the impact of federal workers’ compensation introduction 
in	1911	on	four	classes	of	railroad	workers	in	New	Jersey	and	find	that	
workers’ compensation reduced injuries for outside workers, who are 
high-cost providers of safety, and increased injuries for inside work-
ers, who are low-cost providers of safety. These results suggest that 
there was heterogeneity in the responses of different industries and of 
different types of workers to the introduction of workers’ compensa-
tion programs a century ago.
As	Texas	is	one	of	the	only	states	where	firms	do	not	have	to	pur-
chase workers’ compensation insurance, as well as the state that has 
had nonmandatory workers’ compensation the longest, comparisons 
between	Texas	firms	with	workers’	compensation	insurance	and	those	
without	it	(nonsubscribing	firms)	can	provide	valuable	insights	into	
the role of workers’ compensation in achieving a safe work environ-
ment.	Butler	(1996)	studies	differences	in	injury	rates	between	firms	
that	purchase	workers’	compensation	insurance	and	firms	that	do	not	
and	finds	that	both	types	of	firms	have	similar	fatality	rates.	He	finds	
that	nonsubscribing	firms	have	 slightly	higher	nonfatal	 injury	 rates	
and argues that this is likely because nonsubscribers tend to offer 
occupational	 injury	 plans	 that	 provide	 first-day	 wage-replacement	
benefits,	which	encourage	workers	with	minor	injuries	to	report	their	
injuries. Butler concludes that safety levels are likely similar between 
subscribing	and	nonsubscribing	firms	in	Texas.
In	 her	 survey	of	 large	firms	who	opt	 out	 of	workers’	 compen-
sation	insurance	in	Texas,	Morantz	(2010)	confirms	that	most	firms	
that opt out have alternative occupational-injury insurance plans. 
That	most	firms	have	an	alternative	occupational	injury	plan	suggests	
that	 firms	prefer	 having	 insurance	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 being	 sued.	
Morantz	finds	that	the	majority	of	large	firms	that	opt	out	do	it	to	save	
money,	and	that	about	one-third	of	firms	report	that	they	have	better	
safety outcomes with occupational injury plans than they did with 
workers’ compensation insurance.
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MEASURING	OCCUPATIONAL	SAFETY
Measuring workplace safety is necessary for benchmarking safety 
levels and for determining what factors affect workplace safety, but 
collecting useful and reliable safety measures is a major challenge. 
Most research focuses on rates of reported injuries or on workers’ 
compensation claims. The most commonly used data are the injury 
rates	collected	by	the	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	(BLS)	through	the	
Survey	of	Occupational	Injuries	and	Illnesses	(SOII).	The	SOII	col-
lects	injury	counts	from	a	sample	of	firms	that	are	required	by	OSHA	
to maintain records of injuries. The SOII also collects the number of 
employee hours worked at establishments and uses this information 
to construct injury rates. The published data set includes the num-
ber of injuries with lost workdays, the number of injuries with no 
lost workdays, and the number of workers at the establishment. An 
advantage	of	these	data	is	that	the	record	keeping	is	required	by	the	
federal government, which means the data include information from 
all states.
While the BLS data are likely the best available measure of occu-
pational health and safety outcomes, the SOII has three major short-
comings.	First,	the	survey	does	not	include	all	workers.	Specifically,	
the survey does not include self-employed workers, farm workers, 
firms	with	10	or	fewer	employees,	or	any	government	workers.	Sec-
ond, the survey misses many occupational diseases, especially those 
that take a long time to develop. Finally, as with any data on injuries, 
injuries in the OSHA logs must be reported by workers and recorded 
by	firms,	which	means	misreporting	is	a	concern.	For	more	informa-
tion	on	these	data,	refer	to	Ruser	(2008).
Another way to measure workplace safety is to examine work-
ers’ compensation claims. An advantage of these data is that they are 
more detailed than the BLS data, in that they contain more informa-
tion about the injury, its treatment, and characteristics of the worker. 
Workers’ compensation data may also include injuries and illnesses 
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not contained in the SOII. But as with the BLS data, misreporting is 
also a concern with workers’ compensation claim data. 
Injured	workers	may	not	file	for	workers’	compensation	because	
of	concerns	associated	with	filing	a	claim.	Filing	a	workers’	compen-
sation	claim	may	be	costly	if	employers	dissuade	people	from	filing	
for workers’ compensation because they fear workers’ compensation 
claims will increase their premiums. Injured workers also might not 
want to deal with the paperwork and bureaucracy of workers’ com-
pensation, or they may fear that they will be called on to prove that 
their injury was caused by work. 
Some	workers	may	feel	 there	is	a	stigma	associated	with	filing	
for workers’ compensation, while others may worry that their stand-
ing with the employer will depreciate while they recover from their 
injuries.	 Finally,	 receiving	 workers’	 compensation	 benefits	 is	 not	
guaranteed	even	if	one	files	a	claim.	Biddle	(2001)	shows	that	high	
denial rates of workers’ compensation claims are associated with 
lower application rates. In their survey of injured Michigan work-
ers,	Biddle	and	Roberts	(2003)	find	that	a	majority	of	injured	work-
ers	with	work-related	injuries	do	not	file	for	workers’	compensation	
benefits.	Lakdawalla,	Reville,	and	Seabury	(2007),	using	data	from	
the	National	Longitudinal	Survey	of	Youth,	confirm	that	many	work-
ers who report being injured on the job to the survey report that they 
did	not	file	for	workers’	compensation.	Another	issue	with	workers’	
compensation data is that the data typically come from one particular 
state,	which	makes	generalizing	the	results	difficult.	States	also	have	
different reporting and data collection procedures, which complicates 
efforts to combine workers’ compensation data from multiple states. 
The	National	Council	on	Compensation	Insurance	(NCCI)	provides	
one of the few publicly available resources on different states’ work-
ers’ compensation premiums and claims. To produce these data, 
NCCI surveys workers’ compensation insurers each year about the 
premiums they receive and the claims they pay. NCCI publishes these 
state averages each year for most states in its Annual Statistical Bul-
letin	(NCCI	2014).	
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Individual-level government-collected survey data, such as the 
National	 Health	 Interview	 Survey	 (NHIS)	 and	 the	 March	 Current	
Population	 Survey	 (CPS),	 provide	 other	measures	 of	 safety	 in	 the	
United States and have several advantages over other data. Unlike 
workers’ compensation data, survey data contain detailed informa-
tion about a sample of all workers, regardless of whether they claim 
workers’ compensation. This more detailed information about work-
ers includes demographics, education, and sometimes information on 
family members, work, and medical histories.
The NHIS is collected by the National Center for Health Sta-
tistics	and	asks	various	questions	about	 injuries,	 including	whether	
injuries are work-related, the types of injuries, whether the injuries 
caused individuals to miss work, and what types of medical care 
workers received. The NHIS also collects other relevant demographic 
and health information. In addition to relying on proxy respondents, 
the	public-use	NHIS	does	not	contain	state	identifiers,	meaning	cross-
state comparisons are not possible. Because much of workers’ com-
pensation research focuses on differences across states, the lack of 
state	identifiers	greatly	reduces	the	NHIS’s	use	to	researchers.
The March CPS asks respondents if they have received work-
ers’ compensation income in the past year. This information has 
been	frequently	used	by	researchers.	Although	it	is	not	a	panel	data	
set, respondents can be linked across surveys, which gives the data 
a panel component. A shortcoming of CPS data is that they contain 
no details about injuries, workers’ compensation payments, or medi-
cal treatment. Other individual-level surveys with injury and work-
ers’ compensation information are the Survey of Income and Pro-
gram Participation, the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, and the 
National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth.4
While injury rates and workers’ compensation claims are a natu-
ral measure of workplace safety, the fact that workers, treating physi-
cians,	or	firms	have	to	report	these	injuries	is	problematic.	As	will	be	
explained	later,	any	factor	that	affects	safety	incentives	also	influences	
the decision to report injuries, which means reported injury rates are 
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a	flawed	measure	of	safety.	As	Morantz	(2010)	explains,	“Probably	
the single most important obstacle [to estimating the effect of work-
ers’ compensation on safety] is the paucity of truly exogenous safety 
metrics	that	are	invulnerable	to	changes	in	over-	or	under-reporting.”
One measure that may have fewer reporting concerns than inju-
ries is occupational deaths from traumatic injuries, which are impos-
sible	for	workers	to	misreport	and	difficult	for	firms	to	misreport.	In	
addition to collecting injury information, the BLS also maintains a 
census of occupational deaths, called the Census of Fatal Occupa-
tional	 Injuries	 (CFOI).	 Federal	 law	 requires	 firms	 to	 notify	OSHA	
within eight hours of an occupational death. The BLS collects this 
information from OSHA and supplements it with other data sources 
such	as	death	certificates	and	workers’	compensation	records	to	pro-
duce the CFOI. Unlike with the SOII, the CFOI includes public- 
sector and self-employed workers. Prior to the BLS producing the 
CFOI, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH)	 produced	 the	 National	 Traumatic	 Occupational	 Fatality	
surveillance	system,	using	death	certificates.	Although	occupational	
deaths from traumatic events are more likely to be reported correctly, 
occupational deaths from slowly developing diseases are still subject 
to substantial reporting biases.5
TRENDS	IN	WORK-RELATED	INJURIES
Figure 4.1 plots injury rates from the BLS data since 1975 and 
shows that reported work-related injury rates in the United States have 
been falling since the 1990s. The 1.7 injuries with lost workdays per 
100	workers	in	2013	is	59	percent	smaller	than	the	equivalent	1990	
rate, while the 1.6 injuries without lost workdays per 100 workers in 
2013 is 66 percent smaller than the 1990 rate. The injury rate for men 
is	approximately	23	percent	higher	than	for	women,	likely	reflecting	
that men are in jobs with more manual labor. Sprains, strains, and 
tears account for roughly 40 percent of injuries. 
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As with occupational injuries, occupational deaths have fallen 
since the 1990s. Figure 4.2 shows the number of occupational deaths 
each year reported in the CFOI from 1992 to 2013. In 2013, 4,585 
occupational deaths occurred. Of these, 41 percent occurred because 
of transportation injuries; 17 percent from violence by people or 
animals;	16	percent	by	contact	with	objects	and	equipment;	16	per-
cent from falls, slips, and trips; 7 percent from exposure to harm-
ful	substances	or	environments;	and	3	percent	from	fires	and	explo-
sions. Men account for the vast majority of occupational deaths (93 
percent).	The	highest	death	rates	come	from	agriculture	(23.2	deaths	
per	100,000	full-time	equivalent	[FTE]	workers),	transportation	and	
Figure	4.1		Occupational	Injuries	per	100	Workers	in	Private	Industry,	
1975–2013
NOTE: The y axis represents number of injuries of each type per 100 workers. Total 
lost workday cases include those with days away from work and those with restrict-
ed work activity. For 1978, 1979, 1983, and 1984, the BLS did not include small 
employers in low-risk injuries in the survey, so the BLS imputed these data. Begin-
ning in 1992, the data exclude fatalities.
SOURCE: Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, from the BLS.
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warehousing	(14.0	deaths	per	100,000	FTE	workers),	mining	(12.4	
deaths	per	100,000	FTE	workers),	and	construction	(9.7	deaths	per	
100,000	FTE	workers).
No consensus has been reached about why injury rates and deaths 
have fallen so dramatically. Some have speculated that the decline in 
injuries comes from shifts in what types of industry are most preva-
lent. Indeed, the injury rate varies a lot by industry, and the industrial 
mix of the United States has changed over the past few decades. Fig-
ure 4.3 illustrates the U.S. economy’s transition to being more service 
oriented. In 1975, there were approximately 85 percent more workers 
in construction, manufacturing, mining, and logging than there were 
in professional services, education, and health. By 2013, the share of 
workers in professional services, education, and health was more than 
double the share in construction, manufacturing, mining, and logging.
Although these patterns are consistent with shifts in industry 
driving	the	lower	injury	rates,	 the	significant	decline	in	injury	rates	
Figure 4.2  Number of Fatal Work Injuries, 1992–2013
SOURCE: BLS Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries. Data from 2001 exclude occu-
pational deaths from the September 11 terrorist attacks.
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has also occurred within industries, which suggests that changes in 
the industrial composition have not, by themselves, driven the fall in 
injury rates. For instance, manufacturing was one of the more danger-
ous industries in 1994, with 12.2 injuries per 100 workers. By 2013, 
the injury rate had fallen to 4.0 injuries per 100 workers in manufac-
turing. Furthermore, it is not clear that the industries that dominate the 
U.S. workforce now are safer than the industrial composition of past 
decades. While the professional and business services sector had an 
injury rate of less than 2.0 injuries per 100 workers in 2013, the health 
care sector had an injury rate of 4.7 injuries per 100 workers, which is 
the highest of any of the BLS’s broad injury categories.
Researchers have offered multiple alternative explanations for 
declining injury rates and occupational deaths. Boden and Ruser 
(2003)	 argue	 that	 workers’	 compensation	 reforms	 that	 made	 filing	
for	 workers’	 compensation	more	 difficult	 suppressed	 the	 reporting	
of	injuries,	while	Barkume	and	Ruser	(2001)	contend	that	deregula-
tion of workers’ compensation increased safety. Conway and Svenson 
Figure 4.3  Private Industry Shares, 1975–2013
SOURCE: BLS Current Employment Statistics.
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(1998)	 argue	 that	workers’	 compensation	 reforms	 decreased	 injury	
rates and that unions, employers, and workers’ compensation insurers 
have developed a better understanding of workplace hazards. Ussif 
(2004)	claims	that	the	gradual	improvement	over	time	of	technology,	
information, and safety initiatives is what has been responsible for the 
decline in injury rates.
Regardless of the reason for the decline, the fall in the number 
of reported injuries and illnesses has translated into workers’ com-
pensation	insurers	paying	less	in	benefits.	Figure	4.4	shows	cash	and	
medical payments from 1980 to 2012. From the early 1990s, when 
benefits	reached	a	maximum,	until	2012,	workers’	compensation	cash	
benefits	per	$100	of	covered	wages	fell	by	48	percent,	which	mirrors	
the trend in lost workday injuries. Workers’ compensation medical 
benefits	per	$100	of	covered	wages	fell	only	by	21	percent	during	this	
Figure	4.4		Workers’	Compensation	Medical	and	Cash	Benefits	per	
$100 of Covered Wages, 1980 to 2012
SOURCE: Estimates from the National Academy of Social Insurance.
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time period, likely because the price of medical care rose dramatically 
over the period.
THE	THEORETICAL	EFFECT	OF	WORKERS’	
COMPENSATION	BENEFITS	AND	EXPERIENCE	 
RATING	ON	SAFETY
The	benefits	paid	from	workers’	compensation	programs	have	the	
potential	to	influence	safety	incentives,	since	they	change	the	cost	of	
injuries	for	workers	and	for	firms.	Higher	medical	or	wage-loss	bene-
fits	make	injuries	less	costly	for	workers,	which	gives	them	incentives	
to take more risks and to pay less attention to safety. Therefore, higher 
benefits	have	the	potential	to	lead	to	lower	safety	efforts	by	workers	
and higher injury rates from these lower efforts.
The	incentive	effects	of	workers’	compensation	benefits	for	firms	
come	 from	 the	 fact	 that	many	firms	 are	 experience	 rated,	meaning	
their premiums are based on their previous claims experience. The 
premium	 of	 an	 experience-rated	 firm	 is	 a	weighted	 average	 of	 the	
premium	based	on	the	risk	of	the	occupations	of	workers	at	a	firm	and	
the	firm’s	actual	loss	experience,	where	the	weight	placed	on	actual	
loss	experience	grows	with	firm	size.	Firms	that	self-insure	bear	all	of	
the	costs	of	workers’	compensation	benefits	directly,	which	is	essen-
tially full-experience rating.6	 For	 experience-rated	 firms,	 anything	
that raises the amount paid out to workers through workers’ compen-
sation will lead to higher workers’ compensation premiums, which 
gives	firms	an	incentive	to	increase	safety	efforts.
These	 countervailing	 influences	 of	 benefits	 on	 workers	 and	
firms	mean	 the	net	effect	of	higher	workers’	compensation	benefits	
on safety is theoretically ambiguous; therefore, determining the net 
effect	 requires	 empirical	 tests.	However,	 research	 that	 studies	 how	
features of workers’ compensation affect safety runs into a major 
empirical challenge, in that any factor that makes receiving workers’ 
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compensation more attractive to workers or that increases the cost of 
workers’	compensation	claims	for	firms	may	have	reporting	effects	
in	addition	to	safety	effects.	Workers	have	greater	incentives	to	file	
for	 workers’	 compensation	 when	 benefits	 increase,	 because	 filing	
is	now	more	valuable	for	them.	Similarly,	benefit	increases	provide	
experience-rated	 firms	with	 incentives	 to	 discourage	workers	 from	
filing	and	to	increase	claims	management	practices,	which	are	strate-
gies to reduce workers’ compensation costs without increasing safety. 
Beneficial	 claims-management	practices	 include	 taking	proper	 care	
to make sure workers fully recover from injuries and accommodating 
workers as they return to work. Perverse claims-management prac-
tices include pressing workers to return to work before they have fully 
healed and contesting workers’ valid injury claims.
These reporting incentives mean that studies that examine how 
injury	rates	change	after	workers’	compensation	benefits	change	are	
estimating	the	net	effect	of	benefits	on	firms’	and	workers’	safety	and	
reporting	actions.	Estimating	the	effect	of	benefits	on	claiming	rates	
is the goal for many studies because they are interested in understand-
ing	the	financial	impact	of	benefit	changes	on	workers’	compensation	
claims and costs, but these empirical challenges complicate studies 
examining	the	effects	of	workers’	compensation	benefits	on	safety.
THE	EFFECT	OF	WORKERS’	COMPENSATION	BENEFITS	
ON	SAFETY
The	Effect	on	Nonfatal	Injury	Rates
A large empirical literature has examined the effect of workers’ 
compensation	benefit	increases	on	injury	rates	and	claiming	behavior.	
Chelius	(1982)	and	Ruser	(1985)	both	use	BLS	data	aggregated	by	
industry	classification	to	study	how	differences	in	workers’	compen-
sation	benefits	are	correlated	with	injury	rates.	Chelius	finds	that	an	
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industry	having	10	percent	higher	workers’	compensation	benefits	is	
associated with a 1.2 percent higher rate of lost workday cases. Ruser 
finds	that	having	10	percent	higher	benefits	is	associated	with	1.2	to	
3.1	 percent	more	 lost	workday	 cases.	 Both	 studies	 find	 suggestive	
evidence	that	there	is	a	smaller	positive	correlation	between	benefits	
and rates of injuries without missed days of work.
Butler	and	Worrall	(1983)	estimate	the	effect	of	benefits	on	work-
ers’ compensation claims in 35 states by using workers’ compensation 
data	from	NCCI,	aggregated	at	the	state	and	year	level.	They	find	that	
10	percent	higher	benefits	are	associated	with	a	4.1	percent	increase	
in	claims.	They	also	find	that	the	length	of	the	waiting	period	before	
workers	can	receive	cash	benefits	lowers	the	frequency	of	temporary	
total and minor permanent partial disabilities but not major perma-
nent partial disabilities. These early studies all imply that workers’ 
claiming	or	safety	decisions	are	influenced	by	benefit	levels.
The	conclusions	of	these	first	studies	are	based	on	differences	in	
benefit	rates	across	states	and	industries	and	do	not	control	for	unob-
served differences across states that may lead to high workers’ com-
pensation	benefits	and	high	injury	rates.	An	issue	with	these	methods	
is	that	high-risk	industries	or	states	may	offer	more	generous	benefits	
as a way of enticing workers into risky jobs, which would lead to a 
positive	correlation	between	benefits	and	injuries	even	if	benefit	rates	
had	no	independent	influence	on	injury	rates.
Later research examines injury rates after states change their 
benefits,	 so	 the	 results	 are	 robust	 to	 unobserved	 differences	 across	
states.	Krueger	(1990)	uses	data	from	the	March	CPS	matched	with	
workers’	compensation	benefits	in	the	mid-1980s	and	estimates	that	
a	 10	 percent	 increase	 in	 workers’	 compensation	 benefits	 increases	
workers’ compensation receipt by about 7 percent. Thus, even after 
accounting for unobserved differences, early studies found that work-
ers’	compensation	benefits	have	a	larger	impact	on	workers’	actions	
than	on	firms’	actions,	since	claims	and	benefit	payments	increased	
in	response	to	a	rise	in	the	schedule	of	benefits.	If	firms’	actions	had	
dominated, there would have been a decrease.
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Despite the results of early work, more recent research that 
studies	longer	periods	of	data	and	also	uses	state	benefit	changes	in	
workers’	compensation	benefits	does	not	find	large	impacts	of	benefit	
increases on injury rates or workers’ compensation claims. Guo and 
Burton	(2010)	study	BLS	injury	data	from	the	1980s	and	1990s	and	
find	that	a	10	percent	increase	in	benefits	has	little	or	no	impact	on	
injury	rates.	Bronchetti	and	McInerney	(2012)	use	25	years	of	March	
CPS	data	and	find	that	a	10	percent	increase	in	workers’	compensa-
tion	benefits	increases	workers’	compensation	receipt	by	less	than	1	
percent. Bronchetti and McInerney attribute their smaller estimates 
of	 the	 effect	 of	 benefits	 on	workers’	 compensation	 receipt	 to	more	
flexibly	controlling	for	a	person’s	past	wages,	but	they	also	find	that	
workers	have	been	less	responsive	to	benefit	changes	since	1990.
These	more	recent	results	suggest	no	significant	effect	of	benefit	
rates on workers’ safety choices. One possible reason that workers 
may	not	respond	to	benefit	changes	by	altering	their	safety	effort	is	
that	 the	 changes	 to	workers’	 compensation	 benefits,	while	 large	 in	
some ways, are small compared to the effects on workers’ health. For 
instance,	a	10	percent	increase	in	the	maximum	weekly	benefit	could	
have	a	major	 impact	on	workers’	 compensation	costs	 for	firms	but	
would	be	less	than	$100	per	week	for	workers	in	most	states,	which	
may not be enough to affect safety decisions when considering the 
long-term impact of an injury or disease on the worker’s health.
Studying	 benefit	 changes	 is	 a	 common	 and	 generally	 accepted	
research method in economics. Given that there are vast unobserved 
differences across states and industries, research that can compare 
a treatment group to a control group is a major step forward over 
early research. However, studies using these methods make the 
critical assumption that no other unobserved changes are correlated 
with	workers’	compensation	benefit	increases.	Benefit	increases	that	
accompany other policy changes would muddy the estimates of the 
effect	 of	 benefit	 increases.	 For	 instance,	 if	 states	 increase	 benefits	
while also passing other workers’ compensation policies to increase 
nonmonetary	benefits	for	workers,	the	effect	of	benefits	on	workers’	
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compensation claims or injuries would be overestimated. But if states 
increase	benefits	and	cut	costs	in	other	ways	to	keep	employer	costs	
down,	the	effect	of	benefits	on	workers’	compensation	claims	or	inju-
ries would be underestimated.
Heterogeneous	Effects	for	Experience-Rated	Firms
Regressing injury rates or workers’ compensation claims on ben-
efit	levels	reveals	the	net	effect	of	workers’	compensation	benefits	on	
reported	 injuries	 resulting	 from	both	firms’	and	workers’	 responses	
to	benefit	increases.	To	study	the	effects	on	firms	and	workers	sepa-
rately,	researchers	test	for	different	effects	for	experience-rated	firms.	 
Experience-rated	 firms	 have	 an	 incentive	 to	 improve	 safety	 and	
decrease	 injury	 reports	 after	 benefit	 increases,	 while	 only	 workers	
have	 safety	 and	 reporting	 incentives	 from	 benefit	 changes	 at	 non-
experience-rated	 firms.7 In studying experience rating, researchers 
run into another data limitation in that data sources do not typically 
contain	information	on	which	firms	are	experience	rated.	This	limi-
tation	results	in	researchers	having	to	infer	whether	firms	are	expe-
rience	 rated,	 typically	by	using	firm	size.	Even	 though	firm	size	 is	
likely a good proxy, data still do not include information about the 
degree of experience rating, leading to measurement error.
In	their	studies,	Chelius	and	Smith	(1993)	and	Ruser	(1985)	both	
use	the	average	number	of	employees	at	firms	within	industries	as	a	
proxy	 for	firm	size	and	assume	 that	 industries	with	higher	 average	
workers	per	firm	are	subject	to	a	greater	degree	of	experience	rating.	
Chelius	and	Smith	do	not	find	that	 industries	with	 large	firms	have	
different	responses	to	benefits	in	terms	of	their	injury	rates,	compared	
to	industries	with	smaller	firms.	Ruser,	however,	uses	a	finer	industry	
classification	and	finds	that	the	effect	of	the	interaction	between	firm	
size	and	benefits	on	injury	rates	is	negative.	This	means	that	higher	
benefits	have	less	of	an	effect	on	the	frequency	of	injuries	in	indus-
tries	with	firms	that	are	more	likely	to	be	experience	rated.
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In	 another	 study,	 Ruser	 (1991)	 constructs	 a	 panel	 data	 set	 by	
matching the BLS’s injury data to the BLS Current Employment 
Survey for manufacturers, which allows him to estimate panel mod-
els	 because	 he	 can	 examine	 how	 injury	 rates	 change	 within	 firms	
after	benefits	change.	He	finds	that	a	10	percent	increase	in	benefits	
increases	injury	rates	by	3.8–7.7	percent	in	establishments	with	fewer	
than 100 employees, but only by 1.8 percent in establishments with 
more	than	500	workers.	The	large	positive	effect	of	benefit	increases	
on	 injury	 rates	 suggests	 that	 benefit	 increases	 do	 cause	workers	 to	
report	more	injuries.	The	smaller	interaction	of	benefits	and	firm	size	
indicates	 that	 firms	 that	 are	 likely	 experience	 rated	 take	 actions	 to	
reduce reported injuries, either by improving safety or by discourag-
ing reporting.
Effects	on	Occupational	Deaths	and	on	Different	Types	 
of Injuries
While studies focusing on heterogeneity between small and 
large	 firms	 allow	 for	 testing	 whether	 experience-rated	 firms	 take	
actions to lower reported injuries, these studies still cannot determine 
whether	the	observed	changes	result	from	firms	improving	safety	or	
from	firms	discouraging	workers	from	reporting	injuries.	To	separate	
safety effects from reporting effects, studies examine different types 
and severities of injuries. Presumably, misreporting would be more 
difficult	 for	workers	with	 severe	 injuries	 or	 injuries	 that	 are	 easily	
verifiable.
One set of studies focuses on death rates. With deaths, work-
ers	make	no	reporting	decisions,	so	benefit	increases	do	not	result	in	
workers	being	more	likely	to	report	injuries	or	firms	being	more	likely	
to	discourage	reporting.	Moore	and	Viscusi	(1989)	study	the	effect	of	
benefit	rates	on	death	rates	using	NIOSH’s	National	Traumatic	Occu-
pational	 Fatality	 data	 on	 workplace	 fatalities,	 while	 Ruser	 (1993)	
studies	the	effect	of	benefits	on	death	rates	from	the	BLS	injury	data	
matched	to	firms.
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Both	Moore	and	Viscusi	(1989)	and	Ruser	(1993)	find	that	death	
rates	 decline	 with	 benefits	 and	 interpret	 their	 results	 as	 evidence	
that	 increasing	benefits	 increases	 safety.	This	 in	 turn	 reinforces	 the	
conclusion that the increase in occupational injuries accompanying 
higher	benefits	may	be	from	reporting	effects	on	workers.
Another set of studies argues that if workers’ compensation 
claims increase only because of reporting, then harder-to-diagnose 
injuries	would	respond	to	benefit	increases,	while	easier-to-diagnose	
injuries	would	not.	Ruser	(1998)	uses	BLS	data	and	finds	that	higher	
benefits	 increase	 the	 number	 of	 hard-to-verify	 injuries	 relative	 to	
easy-to-verify injuries. Using panel data on the Quebec construction 
industry,	Bolduc	et	al.	 (2002)	also	find	 that	workers’	compensation	
benefits	increase	the	reporting	of	difficult-to-diagnose	injuries	but	not	
easy-to-diagnose injuries. These results indicate either that workers 
have more control in avoiding easy-to-verify injuries like strains and 
sprains or that reporting incentives dominate safety incentives for 
workers.8
THE	EFFECT	OF	EXPERIENCE	RATING
A variety of papers focus on the direct effects of experience rat-
ing	rather	 than	on	the	heterogeneous	effects	of	benefit	 increases	on	
experience-rated	firms.	Most	of	these	studies	cover	Canadian	work-
ers’ compensation, likely because several recent Canadian reforms 
have shifted experience-rating arrangements and provide natural 
experiments.
Bruce	and	Atkins	(1993)	examine	the	impact	of	the	introduction	
of experience rating in Ontario’s construction and forestry indus-
tries	on	fatality	rates.	They	find	that	experience	rating	is	associated	
with declines in fatality rates, which suggests that experience rating 
improves	 safety.	 Campolieti,	 Hyatt,	 and	 Thomason	 (2006)	 exam-
ine the impact of the introduction of experience rating on workers’ 
compensation claims in British Columbia. After British Columbia 
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introduced experience rating, lost-time claims, medical claims, and 
short-term disability claims all fell, while long-term disability claims 
increased. Campolieti, Hyatt, and Thomason argue that the increase 
in	long-term	claims	might	arise	because	most	of	the	benefits	for	these	
claims are not paid until after the experience-rating window has 
closed,	which	suggests	firms	might	save	money	by	shifting	workers	
with more severe injuries to long-term claims so that their experi-
ence-rating factor is not affected. 
Tompa	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 study	 the	 effect	 of	 a	 2004	Ontario	 policy	
change	that	increased	the	degree	of	experience	rating.	They	find	that	
experience rating decreases the number of reported injuries, espe-
cially for injuries that are easy to dispute. Tompa et al. interpret this 
result	 as	 evidence	 that	 firms	 rely	 on	 perverse	 claims	management	
practices to lower costs rather than on safety improvements.
Other	 research	 surveys	 firms	 directly.	 Although	 surveying	
employers	has	a	disadvantage	in	that	firms	may	not	be	forthcoming	
in their responses, it has the advantage of providing information on 
actual	safety	efforts	rather	than	on	proxies	for	safety.	Kralj	(1994)	sur-
veyed	Ontario	employers	with	experience	rating	and	finds	that	these	
firms	 report	 expanding	 both	 safety	 efforts	 and	 claims	management	
efforts	because	of	experience	rating.	Thomason	and	Pozzebon	(2002)	
surveyed Quebec manufacturers to explore the relationships among 
experience rating, investment in occupational safety and health, and 
claims	management	practices.	They	find	that	experience-rated	firms	
appear to devote more resources to safety practices, such as having 
injury prevention staff and incentivizing safety for their workers. But 
they	also	find	that	firms	increase	claims	management	by	challenging	
more claims and encouraging workers to return to work sooner after 
injuries.
In	addition	to	providing	firms	with	incentives	to	discourage	the	
reporting of work-related injuries, another shortcoming of experience 
rating	is	that	it	may	not	provide	proper	incentives	for	firms	to	focus	
on preventing occupational diseases that may take several years to 
develop.
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Firms would underinvest in preventing slow-to-develop diseases 
if they expected workers to retire or change employers before the 
occupational disease manifests or if it would not surface until after 
the experience-rating period ended. For these reasons, even a per-
fectly	 experience-rated	 firm	may	 have	more	workers	with	 occupa-
tional	diseases	than	would	be	optimal.	For	similar	reasons,	firms	may	
not have proper incentives to make sure workers recover fully from 
their injuries.
EFFECTS	OF	OTHER	ASPECTS	OF	WORKERS’	 
COMPENSATION	ON	SAFETY
In	 addition	 to	 the	 level	 of	workers’	 compensation	 benefits	 and	
the impact of experience rating, any aspect of workers’ compensa-
tion	 that	makes	obtaining	workers’	 compensation	benefits	easier	or	
improves workers’ experience with workers’ compensation has the 
potential to affect safety incentives. In response to the National Com-
mission	report,	mentioned	on	pages	65–66,	which	found	that	workers’	
compensation	benefits	were	inadequate,	many	states	increased	work-
ers’	compensation	benefits	in	the	1980s.	As	a	result,	the	benefits	paid	
from workers’ compensation rose dramatically in the 1980s, which 
can be seen in Figure 4.4 on page 78. These increases in the amount 
of	 benefits	 paid	 resulted	 in	 large	 increases	 in	 workers’	 compensa-
tion premiums for employers. In response to these rising premiums, 
many states introduced workers’ compensation reforms in the 1990s 
to lower workers’ compensation costs. These reforms included the 
following six:
	 1)	 Requiring	workers	to	demonstrate	disability	with	objective	
medical evidence
	 2)	 Restricting	or	eliminating	workers’	choice	of	physician
	 3)	 Capping	legal	fees	or	shifting	the	payment	of	attorneys’	fees	
from insurers to injured workers
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	 4)	 Eliminating	compensation	for	the	aggravation	of	a	preexist-
ing condition or for a condition related to the aging process
	 5)	 Increasing	fraud	detection	by	raising	the	penalties	for	fraud-
ulent claims or by establishing fraud investigation units
	 6)	 Requiring	that	work	be	a	major	or	predominant	cause	of	the	
injury
Ruser,	Pergamit,	 and	Krishnamurty	 (2004)	 study	 the	 effects	 of	
restricting physician choice, increasing fraud detection, and restrict-
ing the types of injuries eligible for workers’ compensation. Since 
these	changes	make	filing	for	workers’	compensation	more	difficult	
and lower the probability of receiving workers’ compensation ben-
efits,	 these	 laws	 increase	 workers’	 safety	 incentives	 while	 reduc-
ing	firms’	 safety	 incentives.	Despite	 the	 theoretical	basis	 for	 safety	
changes,	Ruser,	Pergamit,	 and	Krishnamurty	find	no	 change	 in	 the	
likelihood that individuals in the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey 
of	Youth	were	 injured	 or	 filed	 for	workers’	 compensation	 benefits,	
suggesting either that the reforms had no safety effects or that the 
counteracting effects offset each other. The 1979 National Longitu-
dinal Survey of Youth has the appealing advantage of following indi-
viduals over time, meaning compositional changes to the labor force 
cannot drive the effects.
Boden	 and	Ruser	 (2003)	 study	 those	 states	 that	 restricted	 pro-
vider	choice	as	well	as	states	that	began	requiring	objective	evidence	
for workers’ compensation claims using BLS establishment-level 
data. They compare how injury rates changed over time in states that 
modified	their	laws	compared	to	how	injury	rates	changed	over	time	
in	states	that	did	not	modify	their	laws.	They	find	that	provider	choice	
has no appreciable effect on injury rates, while more stringent evi-
dence	 requirements	 significantly	decrease	 reported	 injury	 rates	 and	
can account for between 7.0 and 9.4 percent of the decline in reported 
injuries from 1991 to 1997.
Workers’ compensation insurance has traditionally been subject 
to a variety of price regulations, but, beginning in the 1970s, some 
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states	 began	 to	 relax	 these	 regulations.	Barkume	and	Ruser	 (2001)	
assess	the	effects	in	states	that	no	longer	require	preapproval	of	insur-
ance prices and the effects in states that no longer have rating bureaus 
that	determine	all	workers’	compensation	insurance	prices.	They	find	
that in addition to lowering workers’ compensation premiums, states 
no	longer	requiring	preapproval	also	led	to	reductions	in	BLS	injury	
rates.
Barkume	and	Ruser	 (2001)	 interpret	 these	 results	 to	mean	 that	
allowing	insurers	to	charge	rates	that	more	closely	reflect	firms’	risk	
of	 losses	encourages	firms	to	 improve	safety.	These	results	provide	
more	evidence	that	having	firms	pay	premiums	that	reflect	their	own	
risk	factors	encourages	firms	to	improve	safety.
However, as discussed throughout this chapter, having premi-
ums	that	more	closely	match	expected	losses	also	encourages	firms	
to increase claims management practices. Thomason, Schmidle, and 
Burton	(2001)	consider	how	competition	 influences	safety	by	com-
paring BLS injury rates in states with three different insurance sys-
tems:	1)	states	with	exclusive-fund	workers’	compensation	insurance,	
2)	 states	 that	 permit	 only	 private	 insurers	 to	 issue	 policies,	 and	 3)	
states	with	competitive	state	funds.	They	find	that	states	with	exclu-
sive-fund workers’ compensation insurance have the highest injury 
rates, followed by states with only private insurers and then by states 
with competitive state funds. These results provide more evidence 
that competition in the insurance market can lower reported injury 
rates. The likely mechanism is through improving risk-based rating 
and more accurate insurance pricing, but we still cannot determine 
whether the lower injury rates are from safety effects or reporting 
effects.
Another	study	examines	the	safety	effects	of	firms	having	large	
deductibles for their workers’ compensation policies, which a major-
ity	 of	 states	 permit.	With	 large	 deductibles,	 even	 smaller	firms	 are	
essentially self-insured until they reach the deductible, which gives 
them an incentive to improve safety levels. Although large deduct-
ibles	 may	 still	 carry	 too	 much	 risk	 for	 small	 firms,	 medium-size	
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firms	can	realize	lower	premiums	from	investing	in	safety	but	still	be	
covered in the case of a catastrophic event. Shields, Lu, and Oswalt 
(1999)	 use	Texas	workers’	 compensation	 claims	 data	 and	 find	 that	
firms	 that	 adopt	 high-deductible	 policies	 experience	 immediate	
declines in large indemnity claims and delayed effects on reducing 
other workers’ compensation claims. They interpret these results to 
suggest	that	improving	safety	takes	time	but	that	firms	can	increase	
claims	management	practices	quickly.	At	any	event,	the	evidence	is	
very strong that more direct employer incentives lead to lower work-
ers’ compensation claims incidence, whether from improved safety or 
from more aggressive claims management.
DIRECT	WORKERS’	COMPENSATION	 
SAFETY	INTERVENTIONS
Many states take a more direct approach to promoting safety 
by	 encouraging	or	 requiring	firms	 to	 develop	 their	 own	 safety	 and	
prevention programs. In several states, incentives provided through 
workers’ compensation are instrumental in encouraging these pro-
grams. Examples of workers’ compensation programs encouraging or 
requiring	safety	programs	include	the	following:
• In	Massachusetts,	assigned	risk	firms	receive	a	workers’	com-
pensation premium credit for enrolling in a loss management 
program.
• North Dakota offers a 5 percent annual discount on workers’ 
compensation	premiums	for	firms	that	enroll	in	a	risk	manage-
ment program.
• Pennsylvania workers’ compensation offers a 5 percent dis-
count	on	workers’	compensation	insurance	premiums	for	firms	
with	a	certified	joint	labor	management	safety	committee.
• From 1991 to 2005, Texas workers’ compensation had a pro-
gram that mandated that the most hazardous workplaces im-
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plement illness and injury prevention programs. This program 
was dropped when Texas made its law nonmandatory.
Although state workers’ compensation programs generally report 
that these programs reduce injuries, very few of these programs have 
been studied by independent researchers. An exception is the Penn-
sylvania	program,	which	Liu	et	al.	 (2010)	study	by	examining	fac-
tors that affect program participation and by estimating the impact of 
safety programs on injury rates. To do this, they combine Pennsylva-
nia workers’ compensation data with unemployment insurance data 
and use propensity score matching to create a control group. They 
find	that	large	firms,	firms	with	higher	injury	rates,	firms	in	high-risk	
industries,	and	firms	without	labor	unions	were	more	likely	to	join	the	
safety committee program and less likely to drop out. Although their 
results	 show	 that	firms	 that	 complied	with	 the	 requirement	 to	 train	
their safety committee members experienced reductions in injuries, 
noncompliance	with	this	requirement	was	too	high	for	them	to	be	able	
to detect an overall effect.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has discussed the role of workers’ compensation 
programs in preventing occupational injuries and illnesses. As we 
explained, factors that make workers’ compensation better or easier 
for workers have the potential to decrease workers’ safety incentives. 
Factors that increase the cost of workers’ compensation increase 
experience-rated	firms’	safety	incentives.
Experience rating, as well as any other strategy to make workers’ 
compensation	premiums	reflect	employers’	past	claims	histories,	also	
has the potential to improve safety and bring it closer to optimal lev-
els. In addition to creating safety incentives, worker-friendly workers’ 
compensation	 policies	 and	 benefits	 also	 have	 reporting	 incentives.	
This complicates empirical research on the role of workers’ compen-
sation in encouraging injury prevention.
92   Hunt and Dillender
Although	much	of	 the	 research	 is	 conflicting	 in	 its	 findings	 or	
cannot	adequately	deal	with	all	of	the	empirical	challenges,	we	con-
sider	the	following	conclusions	to	be	warranted.	First,	having	firms’	
workers’	 compensation	 premiums	 reflect	 previous	 claiming	 history	
appears to improve safety. Having workers’ compensation premi-
ums	reflect	prior	losses	can	be	achieved	through	experience	rating	or	
through encouraging price competition in the workers’ compensation 
insurance market, both of which align premiums with claims experi-
ence. Also, high-deductible workers’ compensation policies can give 
even smaller employers the same incentives for prevention as experi-
ence rating.
While making premiums more closely match claims history 
increases	firms’	attention	to	safety,	it	also	increases	firms’	incentives	
to	discourage	workers	from	claiming	workers’	compensation	benefits	
and to encourage workers to return to work before they are ready. 
As workers likely already underreport work-related injuries, workers’ 
compensation programs must make sure that incentives to improve 
firm	 safety	 do	 not	 result	 in	workers	 being	 left	 out	 of	 the	workers’	
compensation safety net.
Another shortcoming of experience rating is that it does little to 
prevent occupational disease injuries, which develop over long peri-
ods	of	time.	As	workers	have	shorter	tenures	with	firms	now	than	they	
had	in	the	past,	firms	can	expect	that	other	firms	will	have	to	deal	with	
the increased workers’ compensation costs from such occupational 
injuries, which reduces their incentives for prevention.
Although much evidence documents a positive relationship 
between	 injuries	 and	workers’	 compensation	benefits,	we	 think	 the	
evidence	is	inconclusive	that	workers’	compensation	benefits	encour-
age workers to act more recklessly, despite the theoretical basis.
Even given the vast improvements in the empirical sophistica-
tion of research methods and in precautions taken for workers over 
the years, separating out the reporting effects and safety effects for 
workers	and	firms	remains	a	major	challenge.	Similarly,	better	data	
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on injuries is vital in determining whether workplace safety is driving 
down injuries or whether workers are just reporting fewer injuries.
Finally, we conclude that more direct and innovative research is 
needed on the impact of safety programs and on workers’ compensa-
tion	incentives	to	encourage	firms	to	implement	them.	However,	it	is	
clear	that	even	the	best-designed	safety	programs	will	require	compli-
ance for them to succeed.
Notes
  1. For ease of exposition, we use the term injuries throughout the chapter 
to refer to any compensable claim, including occupational diseases.
   2. Broad empirical support is found in economic research that shows 
workers are paid a wage premium for working in riskier jobs. Refer to 
Viscusi	and	Aldy	(2003)	for	a	thorough	review	of	this	literature.
		3.	 While	McInerney	and	Simon	(2012)	find	no	evidence	that	making	work-
ers’	compensation	more	difficult	to	obtain	increases	take-up	of	federal	
disability	insurance,	Dillender	(2015)	and	Heaton	(2012)	both	find	evi-
dence that workers’ having health insurance results in less medical care 
being	paid	 for	 by	workers’	 compensation.	Dillender	 (2016)	 discusses	
the	potential	influence	of	the	Affordable	Care	Act’s	expansion	of	health	
insurance on workers’ compensation insurance. 
		4.	 See	Reville,	Bhattacharya,	and	Weinstein	(2001)	 for	a	 review	of	pos-
sible sources.
  5. It should also be noted that occupational deaths and diseases have 
benefit-adequacy	concerns,	as	many	surviving	spouses	entitled	to	ben-
efits	do	not	receive	the	benefits	due	them.
  6. Retrospective rating is another type of insurance policy that has incen-
tives	similar	to	experience	rating.	With	retrospective	rating,	firms’	pre-
miums depend on their claims during the policy period. Retrospective-
rated	firms	pay	their	premiums	at	the	start	of	the	policy	period.	Firms	
with	high	losses	will	have	to	pay	additional	premiums,	while	firms	with	
low losses will receive refunds on their premiums. Retrospective rating 
is less common than experience rating, and we are unaware of research 
into the safety effects of retrospective rating.
			7.	 If	all	small	firms	improved	safety,	WC	claims	and	costs	would	fall,	since	
premiums	for	small	firms	are	based	on	all	similar	firms’	previous	claims	
experience.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 experience	 rating,	 however,	 one	 firm’s	
actions cannot have a noticeable effect on its own premiums.
94   Hunt and Dillender
  8. Comparisons of hard-to-diagnose injuries and easy-to-diagnose injuries 
originate from a set of papers that study increased claiming on Mondays 
as	a	way	to	test	whether	workers’	compensation	benefits	induce	people	
to	claim	that	non-work-related	injuries	are	work	related.	Smith	(1990)	
pioneered this research by showing in workers’ compensation claims 
data that harder-to-diagnose injuries such as strains and sprains are more 
likely to be reported on Mondays than easier-to-diagnose injuries like 
cuts	and	fractures.	Smith	interprets	his	findings	as	evidence	that	workers	
purposefully misreport some non-work-related injuries from the week-
end as being work related. However, in their studies of the Monday 
effect,	Campolieti	and	Hyatt	(2006)	and	Card	and	McCall	(1996)	find	
evidence that is inconsistent with Smith’s interpretation.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In	this	final	chapter,	we	will	review	some	of	our	findings	from	earlier	
chapters,	with	a	focus	on	what	those	findings	tell	us	about	workers’	
compensation performance and policy issues. The previous chapters 
focus on three of the most critical issues in workers’ compensation 
policy:	benefit	adequacy,	injury	prevention,	and	return-to-work	pro-
motion. This concluding chapter provides our overview of the state 
of workers’ compensation programs on these dimensions in the early 
twenty-first	century,	after	approximately	100	years	of	experience	in	
most states and provinces.
BENEFIT	ADEQUACY
Our	chapter	on	benefit	adequacy	departs	in	two	ways	from	most	
of the other empirical work on this subject. First, it includes studies 
of workers’ compensation in Canada and our home state of Michi-
gan that raise some methodological issues. Michigan does not have a 
statutory	designation	of	permanent	partial	disability	(PPD)	compen-
sation as most other states do. As a wage-loss state, Michigan law 
provides	that	lost	earnings	benefits	shall	be	paid	for	the	duration	of	
the disability, with a few exceptions. Furthermore, when claims are 
closed in Michigan, there is no designation of the level of disability, 
so there is no impairment rating available, but simply a record of the 
payments made.1 
Furthermore, the Michigan population of claimants receiving 
lump-sum	settlements	 includes	 those	who	file	claims	with	disputed	
coverage,	questionable	etiology,	causation	issues,	level	of	disability	
controversy, and many other matters without causative attribution. 
Therefore,	it	is	difficult	to	compare	findings	on	the	adequacy	of	work-
ers’	compensation	benefits	in	Michigan	with	states	that	designate	ben-
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efits	according	to	impairment	ratings	and	states	where	PPD	is	specifi-
cally	identified	and	accounted	for.
The Canadian workers’ compensation systems are similar to 
those	in	the	United	States,	with	two	very	significant	differences.	First,	
there is generally no private insurance for work-related injuries in 
Canadian provinces; all workers’ compensation insurance is with 
public	 entities.	 Second,	 benefits	 are	 typically	 more	 generous,	 and	
waiting periods are either shorter or nonexistent. By including studies 
of	these	jurisdictions	in	our	review	of	workers’	compensation	benefit	
adequacy,	we	hope	to	enlarge	the	discussion	and	expand	the	possibili-
ties. This despite the fact that adding more system observations also 
raises the bar for generalization and makes policy conclusions even 
more challenging.
Second,	 our	 preference	 is	 to	 use	 the	 yardstick	 of	 “earnings	
replacement”	 as	 opposed	 to	 “loss	 replacement”	 to	measure	 benefit	
adequacy.	This	means	we	count	both	workers’	compensation	wage-
loss	benefits	paid	and	actual	earnings	after	the	injury	as	income	and	
offset these against the estimated wages that would have been earned 
in the absence of injury. We think this is a more useful measure of 
average	benefit	adequacy	than	loss	replacement	rates.	Loss	replace-
ment rates consider postinjury earnings as reducing the losses suf-
fered by the injured worker, but they also serve to narrow the focus 
to just the performance of the workers’ compensation system rather 
than the broader social goal of maintaining workers’ incomes during 
disability. 
Previous	empirical	work	on	workers’	compensation	benefit	ade-
quacy	has	concluded	that	these	benefits	are	far	from	meeting	reason-
able	standards	of	adequacy—usually	set	at	replacement	of	two-thirds	
of lost wages after taxes. Furthermore, some studies indicate that the 
performance seems to be worse for the more serious injury cases, as 
indicated by duration of disability or impairment rating. 
Despite the limitations to comparison imposed by major policy 
and analytical differences, it appears that the Michigan workers’ com-
pensation	system	provides	more	adequate	benefits	 than	many	other	
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state systems. This appears to be largely due to the wage-loss orienta-
tion	and	the	“spendable	earnings”	wage	replacement	formula	used	in	
Michigan. Taking account of income, payroll taxes, and family size 
clearly provides the opportunity for tailoring wage-loss replacement 
more closely to apparent need across all workers. So, despite a lower 
maximum	benefit	in	Michigan	set	at	90	percent	of	the	state	average	
weekly wage, versus 100 percent in most U.S. states, workers’ com-
pensation	wage-loss	benefits	in	Michigan	look	pretty	good.
If	 the	Michigan	benefits	appear	 to	be	better	 than	in	some	other	
U.S.	states,	they	are	clearly	not	as	adequate	as	in	the	Canadian	systems	
that	have	had	similar	wage-loss	studies.	Benefits	in	British	Columbia	
and	Ontario	are	significantly	more	generous	than	in	Michigan	or	in	
other	U.S.	states.	This	is	reflected	in	higher	wage-replacement	ratios,	
higher	maximum	benefits,	and	shorter	waiting	periods	(if	any).	It	may	
also	reflect	 the	fact	 that	all	 the	Canadian	provinces	have	exclusive-
fund	(monopolistic)	public	insurers	for	workers’	compensation.
Whether	 this	 results	 in	more	 “generous”	 administration	 of	 the	
systems	 as	 well	 is	 debatable,	 but	 the	 realized	 benefits	 are	 clearly	
superior.
There	 remains	 the	crucial	 issue	of	 the	adequacy	of	benefits	 for	
permanent or long-term injuries. This has been the focus of most of 
the earlier empirical work on the subject, and the results are not reas-
suring:	The	comparative	study	done	by	Reville	et	al.	(2001)	showed	
a range of 29 to 46 percent for 10-year loss-replacement rates for 
the	five	states	 included	 in	 the	study.	Tompa,	Mustard,	et	al.	 (2010)	
found aggregate loss-replacement rates of around 100 percent for 
claims with more than 50 percent impairment ratings under both the 
impairment standard in Ontario before 1990 and the loss-of-earnings-
capacity	standard	in	Ontario	after	1990.	For	the	“bifurcated	benefit”	
system in British Columbia before 2002, the loss-replacement rate for 
these claims was 126 percent.2 
In Michigan’s wage-loss system, since there is no impairment 
rating, we focus just on those claims that receive lump-sum settle-
ments	(called	“redemptions”	in	Michigan).	While	it	is	no	doubt	cor-
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rect that most of these claims would receive permanent partial awards 
in other U.S. states, there is no way to compensate for the additional 
proportion of these claims that might be compromised over disputes 
on coverage, etiology, or other issues. Inclusion of these claims would 
presumably	bias	the	Michigan	measure	of	adequacy	downward.
Yet the lump-sum settlement claims in Michigan showed a 92 
percent loss-replacement rate and a 95 percent earnings-replacement 
rate for the observed average of 4.5 years after the injury. When this 
is extrapolated to 10 years, including the claim reserves held by the 
insurer, the earnings replacement rate falls to 67 percent, still a decent 
performance. Results are slightly better for claims with wage-loss 
benefit	duration	over	52	weeks	but	no	lump-sum	settlement.	Again,	
benefit	adequacy	appears	to	be	better	in	Michigan	than	in	the	other	
U.S.	states	where	benefit	adequacy	has	been	studied.
The	 last	 issue	 raised	by	 the	benefit	adequacy	chapter	 is	 that	of	
leaving the labor force as a result of a compensable injury. Injured 
workers	who	file	workers’	compensation	claims	appear	to	experience	
a permanent drop in labor force participation similar to that which 
occurs when the employer goes out of business completely. While 
the reasons for this drop in labor force participation are unclear, it 
further	complicates	the	analysis	of	benefit	adequacy.	It	raises	the	issue	
of whether withdrawal from the labor force was caused by the com-
pensable injury itself, the settlement of the claim, or perhaps by other 
influences.	However,	it	is	still	troubling	to	think	that	so	many	injured	
workers are not able to resume their work lives after a compensable 
injury.
PREVENTION	INCENTIVES
As economists, we begin with the assumption that both workers 
and	employers	(with	their	insurer	representatives)	make	choices	about	
providing safety and about their response to injury. Employers pro-
vide the workplace and explicitly select the level of safety designed 
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into that workplace. They also adopt human resource policies that 
may encourage or discourage safe behaviors. Workers may accept the 
safety	environment	of	the	firm,	but	they	still	make	choices	about	how	
careful they will be in preventing an injury and how they will respond 
to incentives provided after an injury.3
What	makes	 this	 interesting	 is	 that	 the	 financial	 incentives	 for	
workers and employers contradict each other. Employers seek to 
minimize costs for a given level of production. This would include 
compensating wage differentials for the risk of injury, the costs of 
producing a safer environment, and the costs of workers’ compen-
sation insurance. Workers face the loss of income during a period 
of disability plus the obvious pain, suffering, and inconvenience that 
may accompany the injury itself. But better workers’ compensation 
benefits	(i.e.,	higher	earnings-replacement	rates)	reduce	the	incentive	
for workers to avoid injury.
Although much empirical evidence points to a positive relation-
ship	between	frequency	of	injuries	and	workers’	compensation	ben-
efits,	we	feel	the	evidence	is	inconclusive	that	better	workers’	com-
pensation	benefits	actually	encourage	workers	to	act	more	recklessly,	
despite the theoretical basis and despite the fact that claim rates are 
often	 higher	 after	 benefits	 increase.	This	 is	 because	 there	 is	 also	 a	
reporting effect observed when compensation is improved. If the 
incentive	to	report	the	injury	is	increased	by	more	generous	benefits,	
a larger proportion of injuries will be reported, and a higher incidence 
of claims will be observed. Separating reporting effects from safety 
effects among injured workers remains a major empirical challenge.
However, making workers’ compensation premiums more accu-
rately	 reflect	 the	 previous	 claims	 history	 of	 individual	 employers	
appears to improve employers’ safety and prevention efforts, as well 
as to encourage employers to devote more attention to the worker’s 
successful return to work. Methods to make premium levels more 
closely match claims history include experience-rated premiums, 
encouraging more competition in the workers’ compensation insur-
ance market, and offering high-deductible plans to employers. All of 
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these devices should help to make the employers’ cost of workers’ 
compensation	insurance	more	closely	reflect	the	actual	cost	of	inju-
ries,	thereby	bringing	financial	incentives	into	alignment	with	policy	
objectives.
Despite the promise of having insurance premiums more closely 
match actual claim costs, thus providing improved signaling about 
prevention behavior, policymakers need to be aware of two concerns. 
First,	 claim	 costs	 that	 influence	 premiums	 also	 provide	 firms	with	
incentives to discourage workers from claiming workers’ compensa-
tion	benefits	at	all,	and	such	behaviors	 likely	encourage	workers	 to	
return to work before they are ready. In both cases, claim costs and 
future premiums will be lower even though it is not clear that the 
policy objective has been met.
Second,	 having	 claim	 costs	 influence	 employer	 insurance	 pre-
miums does little to prevent occupational diseases or other injuries 
that develop over long periods of time. Even self-insured employers 
who pay all workers’ compensation costs directly still have too many 
such disability claims. Thus, while market-signal incentives could be 
improved, it does not seem possible to replace direct regulation of 
safety and health matters with market incentives through the work-
ers’ compensation program. We will continue to need public health 
standards and direct enforcement mechanisms to protect the health of 
workers and others. 
RETURN	TO	WORK
While preventing work-related disability should be our ultimate 
aim,	 and	 ensuring	 adequate	 compensation	 our	 intermediate	 policy	
goal, returning the injured worker to his or her place of employment 
is the immediate practical challenge. We will never be able to prevent 
all	injuries	and	diseases,	and	maintaining	adequate	benefits	is	a	politi-
cal	struggle	with	ebbs	and	flows,	but	there	should	be	no	dispute	about	
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return to work as the goal for all stakeholders in workers’ compensa-
tion programs.
The	“win-win”	aspect	of	return	to	work	is	highly	motivating,	as	
workers’ incomes will be higher and employers’ costs will be lower 
if injured workers can be put back to work more swiftly and safely. 
But this takes a continuous, concentrated, and coordinated effort to 
achieve.4 The term disability management has come to represent 
a	 workplace-focused	 approach	 that	 includes	 a	 set	 of	 techniques	
designed	 to	 improve	return-to-work	performance.	These	 techniques	
began to be applied in the 1980s as workers’ compensation costs 
increased at unprecedented rates. Leading employers perceived that 
the	“soft	glove”	was	more	productive	than	the	“hard	fist”	when	it	came	
to coping with work-related disability. Maintaining contact with the 
injured worker, improving medical management, and accommodat-
ing	limitations	at	work,	including	job	modification,	schedule	changes,	
and alternative work assignments, were demonstrated to reduce the 
incidence and duration of work-related disability.
Furthermore, the disability-management approach aligns natu-
rally with employee retention by the original at-injury employer, 
which produces vastly superior return-to-work results for the injured 
worker while it also demonstrates the employer’s commitment to the 
workforce. As well, it may also reduce the cost of disability when 
viewed	from	a	social	perspective	 (Ben-Shalom	2015).	So	what	has	
been	 the	 impact	 of	 disability	 management	 techniques	 on	 workers’	
compensation	outcomes?	Unfortunately,	we	have	to	be	satisfied	with	
indirect evidence of these impacts. The number of reported occupa-
tional injuries and illnesses with any days away from work declined 
by	66	percent	from	1993	to	2013	(BLS	2016).	 In	most	U.S.	states,	
three	to	seven	days	away	from	work	are	required	to	qualify	for	wage-
loss	 benefits,	 so	 the	 number	 of	 workers’	 compensation	 wage-loss	
claims has obviously declined rapidly as well. The National Council 
on	Compensation	Insurance	(NCCI)	reports	a	58	percent	decline	in	
such claims between 1993 and 2010 (Sengupta, Baldwin, and Reno 
2014).	Interestingly,	the	average	duration	for	workers’	compensation	
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wage-loss claims has actually risen over the past two decades. We 
conjecture	 that	 disability-management	 techniques	 are	 more	 effec-
tive at targeting small workers’ compensation claims for relatively 
minor injuries than they are at shortening claims arising from serious 
or catastrophic injuries. This would explain the increase in duration 
of claims. 
Additionally, the number of cases with restricted work, which 
includes	the	effect	of	many	disability	management	techniques,	rose	
from the mid-1980s through 2000 at the same time that the num-
ber of cases with days away from work was declining (Ruser and 
Wiatrowski	 2013).	We	 believe	 this	 reflects	 the	 spread	 of	 disability	
management	 techniques	 through	 the	 ranks	 of	 employers,	 insurers,	
and	providers	and	their	subsequent	impact	on	workers’	compensation	
claims and return-to-work outcomes for injured workers.
Credible evidence on the impact of return-to-work programs is 
sparse but promising. Impacts of up to 40 percent reduction in dis-
ability	 duration	 have	 been	 reported	 among	 large	 self-insured	 firms	
(McLaren,	Reville,	and	Seabury	2010).	Several	review	articles	have	
found strong empirical support for the effects of disability manage-
ment	 techniques.	 We	 conclude	 that	 properly	 motivated	 disability	
management	techniques	can	remove	many	barriers	to	return-to-work	
for workers with impairments, which reduces both workers’ com-
pensation costs for employers and lost wages for workers. Disability 
management holds considerable promise for improving this critical 
performance dimension of workers’ compensation systems. This is 
reflected	 in	 the	plethora	of	 state	policy	 innovations	 that	directly	or	
indirectly support or encourage these interventions.
There remain some concerns about the potential for disability 
management	to	descend	into	claims-discouraging	activities,	or	“per-
verse	disability	management,”	which	has	the	goal	of	reducing	claims	
volume or severity to reduce workers’ compensation costs without 
benefit	 to	 the	 injured	worker.	We	 believe	 that	workers’	 compensa-
tion claims suppression is real and is practiced by some employers 
and	their	insurers	for	financial	gain.	However,	we	also	believe	that,	
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overall, disability management has been a positive development in 
workers’	compensation	systems	and	has	benefited	both	injured	work-
ers and their employers. We need better focus and more measurable 
outcomes	to	ensure	that	these	benefits	are	realized.
So, where do workers’ compensation programs stand after a cen-
tury	of	experience?	The	ProPublica/NPR	series	of	publications	begin-
ning	in	2015	raised	serious	questions	about	the	performance	of	our	
state workers’ compensation systems.5 The title of the initial article, 
“The	Demolition	 of	Workers’	 Compensation”	 (Grabell	 and	 Berkes	
2015),	prompted	widespread	reaction,	both	pro	and	con.	
According	to	the	U.S.	Department	of	Labor,	“Recent	years	have	
seen	significant	changes	 to	 the	workers’	compensation	 laws,	proce-
dures	and	policies	 in	numerous	states,	which	have	 limited	benefits,	
reduced the likelihood of successful application for workers’ com-
pensation, and/or discouraged injured workers from applying for ben-
efits”	(USDOL	2016,	p.	2).	
Furthermore,	 “Some	 state	 legislatures	 continue	 to	 attempt	 to	
reduce workers’ compensation costs, and proposals for statutory 
amendments	 that	 restrict	 workers’	 benefits	 or	 access	 have	 become	
increasingly	bold”	(USDOL	2016,	p.	2).	This	has	extended	up	to	and	
including	 the	“opt	out”	 legislation	 in	Texas	and	Oklahoma	and	 the	
discussions in Tennessee and South Carolina. It remains to be seen 
whether an effective replacement for traditional workers’ compensa-
tion programs will emerge from these experiments. 
However,	we	find	that	for	the	three	performance	dimensions	exam-
ined	here,	things	are	not	quite	so	bleak	in	the	workers’	compensation	
world. First, there are design elements, such as the spendable earnings 
approach within a strict wage-loss system, that seem to provide better 
adequacy	of	workers’	compensation	benefits	 than	the	medical-based	
impairment-and-gross-earnings-replacement approach. Second, work-
ers’ compensation and other market incentives do appear to improve 
employer safety and prevention performance. They also seem to affect 
the claiming behavior of injured workers. Third, disability manage-
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ment	techniques	can	significantly	reduce	the	burden	of	work-related	
disability for both workers and employers in our workplaces. 
We hope this modest volume will help policymakers to improve 
the performance of these social insurance systems during their second 
century. There are several ways forward, and they have been imple-
mented in best practice among several state systems. What seems to 
be lacking is the political resolve to change these century-old work-
ers’ compensation systems to move toward better policy and practice 
in the future.
Notes
 		1.	 There	 may	 also	 be	 an	 amount	 reserved	 for	 future	 medical	 benefits,	
which must be reported to CMS at the federal level to facilitate coordi-
nation	with	possible	Medicare	or	Medicaid	benefits.
   2. The bifurcated system provided that the higher of the impairment or the 
loss-of-earning-capacity	benefit	should	be	paid.
			3.	 Of	course,	the	level	of	safety	provided	by	the	firm	may	also	be	a	factor	
in their choice of employer.
			4.	 See	Gifford	and	Parry	(2016)	for	discussion.	
	 5.	 For	a	list	of	this	series	of	articles,	see	ProPublica	(2017).
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